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Does Russia Need a Securities Law?
Greg Lumelsky*
INTRODUCTION
The question in the title of this article is not necessarily rhetorical.
Perhaps a more appropriate inquiry is, does Russia need its current securi-
ties law?' The response to the titular question is, as I will argue, clearly
yes. The answer to the second question is to a large extent negative. Given
the prevailing economic conditions in Russia, the course of enterprise pri-
vatization, and the principal institutions shaping Russian capital markets,
there is good reason to think that rather than assisting the growth and en-
trenchment of a market in securities, much of the current Russian securities
legislation will be superfluous and possibly hinder such growth.
The voucher privatization process, which the Russian government un-
dertook during 1992-1994, was an attempt to create broad-based equity
ownership in formerly state-owned firms. Once vouchers had been dis-
tributed to "every man, woman and child in Russia,"3 the privatization plan
established voucher auctions that enabled individual investors to exchange
their vouchers for pools of shares side-by-side with large institutional
stakeholders, such as voucher investment funds.4 The 1996 Securities Law,
* Associate, Linklaters & Paines. B.A., 1994, Yale University; J.D., 1997, New York Uni-
versity. I am grateful to Professors Barry Adler, Bernard Black, and Reinier Kraakman for
their input and advice. The views expressed in this article are entirely my own. The transla-
tions of Russian legal sources are either from Westlaw or, as necessary, my own.
1 Federal'nyj Zakon o Rynke Tsennykh Bumag [Federal Law on the Securities Market],
No. 39-FZ (1996), published in Ross. GAzETA, Apr. 25, 1996, translation available in
Westlaw, RUSLINE Database, 1996 WL 537483 [hereinafter 1996 Securities Law].2See Anatoly Chubais, Russia: Birth of an Entrepreneurial Nation, WALL ST. J., June
16, 1993, at A12.
3rd.
4 See Neela Banerjee, In Coup for Yeltsin's Privatization Plan, Russians View Vouchers
as Investments, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1992, at A7.
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meant to regulate the resultant securities market,: seems rooted in several
assumptions. First, voucher privatization will actually produce widespread
share ownership among the Russian citizenry on an individual investor
level. Second, even if (as is actually the case) such diffuse ownership of the
Russian corporate sector does not materialize,6 the preferred way to create
an active securities market, comparable to the markets in the United States
and England, is to emulate U.S. means of securities regulation. In Russia's
case, the favored regulatory framework appears to be based on the U.S. Se-
curities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") 7 and U.S. Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("1934 Act").8
I posit that current assumptions underlying the securities regulation re-
gime established by the Russian government and its Federal Commission
for the Securities Markets ("FCSM") are unjustifiably optimistic both as to
the prospect of a U.S.- or English-style securities market taking root in Rus-
sia and as to the relevance and utility of a U.S.-style securities law in its ab-
sence. During the 1930s, the U.S. Congress adopted a federal regulatory
regime based on copious disclosure and civil as well as criminal enforce-
ment through judicial and administrative channels. At that time, the U.S.
Congress was able to take much of the necessary institutional foundation of
such a regime for granted. In Russia today, the situation could not be more
different. A judiciary reared on Soviet-era laws,9 the embryonic state of the
market and security ownership, 10 the inadequate resources provided to the
5See 1996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 1. The 1996 Securities Law actually aims to
regulate "the relations arising at the issue and trading of issued securities ... and also the
specifics in the creation and activity of professional market participants in the securities
market." Although "issued securities" are by definition "placed in issues," see id., art. 2, and
do not, at least on their face, include shares purchased with privatization vouchers, the 1996
Securities Law assumes that the privatization process has produced a securities market in
which Russian issuers are willing to issue shares to both small and large investors who, in
turn, are willing to purchase them. Both the 1996 Securities Law and the Federal Law on
Joint-Stock Companies (Federal'nyj Zakon ob Aktsionemykh Obschestvakh) No. 208-FZ
(1995), published in Ross. GAZETA, Dec. 29, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter.Joint-Stock Company
Law], provide regulations for the protection of shareholders without regard to the origin of
their shares.6A study of Russia's privatized companies by the Russian Federal Commission for the
Securities Market has found that outside shareholder ownership of Russian companies is
small, fragmented, and on the decline, with only 17% of enterprises owned by outside in-
vestors. See John Thomhill, Biting the Bullet, FiN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at 10. A separate
survey reports that only 11% of all privatized companies are majority-owned by outside in-
vestors with sufficiently large stakes (5% or more) to influence the management or restruc-
turing of such companies. See The Rooks Have Come, EcONOMIsT, July 12, 1997, at 17.
715 U.S.C. § 77a (1994).
815 U.S.C. § 78a (1994). See infra Part II.
9See infra Part I.B.
1oSee infra text accompanying notes 51-54.
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FCSM," and the growth of commercial banks as the financial hubs of very
large industrial groups 12 produce a vision of the Russian securities market
sharply at odds with the one contemplated by the 1996 Securities Law.
Assuming the incompatibility of a U.S. regulatory heart with a Russian
market body, one alternative framework for securities regulation in Russia
is a self-enforcing model described by Professors Bernard Black and Re-
inier Kraakman.1 3 Their model, while applied specifically in the context of
the Russian Joint-Stock Company Law, takes into account a large number
of factors peculiar to the Russian legal and economic landscape that are
highly relevant to any chosen regulatory structure for Russian securities.
Because the Joint-Stock Company Law and the 1996 Securities Law share
many interlocking provisions and seek to regulate jointly much of the same
economic terrain, the dissonance between their respective assumptions
could not be more striking. Thus, a portion of this article looks at the 1996
Securities Law through the prism of the Black and Kraakman self-enforcing
model and queries whether this vision should become reality.
15
Part I of this article examines the Russian securities market as it has
developed up to the enactment of the 1996 Securities Law. Where possible,
it traces some parallels to the market conditions and problems that preceded
the passage of the U.S. 1933 and 1934 Acts. Part II introduces the 1996
Securities Law, as well as subsequent decrees by the President of the Rus-
sian Republic and by the FCSM on the further development of the securities
market. It asks whether reconciliation between the discordant regulatory
philosophies underpinning the Joint-Stock Company Law and the 1996 Se-
curities Law is possible or desirable. Postulating that the reconciliation of
regulatory approaches is not only desirable but also essential for the estab-
lishment of a vibrant Russian market in securities, Part LII explores an alter-
native regulatory system which might achieve this goal without the corner-
cutting that has grafted a full-blown U.S.-based system of disclosure and
regulation onto the nascent and as yet under-developed Russian capital
markets. Part IV concludes with a review of the limits of such a system.
I. THE MARKET AS UNCHARTED ZONE
In 1995, the U.S. President and CEO of Renaissance Capital, an in-
vestment fund operating in Russia, proclaimed, "[t]here is [in Russia] no
proper domestic market infrastructure, no audited financial statements from
Russian companies and what's more, very little interest in compliance by
11 See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
12See infra Part I.C.
13Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. Rnv. 1911 (1996).
14 Joint-Stock Company Law, supra note 5.
"5 See infra Part III.
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the Russian corporate community., 16 Concurrently, another observer pre-
dicted that "[t]he capitalization of the Russian equity market will be larger
than all the markets in Latin America within five years time.' 17  Such
varying views are to be expected in a country undergoing the largest na-
tional privatization program in history, the assimilation of a democratically
elected government and judiciary system under a constitution just over four
years old, and the adoption of a legal system at odds with every preceding
law over the last seventy-five years. 18 The unprecedented nature and scale
of such changes make predictions on the basis of "all other things held
equal" almost impossible. Particularly in the areas of Russian corporate
and securities regulation, Russian lawmakers and Western advisors face a
kind of legal Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle 9 : those tracking the Russian
capital markets see changes that render contemplated regulatory regimes in-
appropriate even before they are reduced to laws; those observing the prog-
ress of legislation, on the other hand, observe the painstaking construction
of a latticework for projected structures and institutions which the market
stubbornly refuses to adopt or accept.
The obstacles Russia faces in creating a dynamic and viable securities
market are numerous, but several broad areas are particularly significant.
First, to the managers of a majority of the enterprises privatized over the
past four years, the concept of shareholder rights and fiscal responsibility is
either foreign or hostile, and frequently both. In part, the hostility is justi-
fiable because seventy years of socialism destroyed even vestigial concep-
16 Peter Lee, Sitting Out the Russian Winter, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1996, at 50, 51 [hereinaf-
ter Lee, Russian Winter].
171d. at 53.
"8 By one count, almost the entire field of Russian law has been recodified since 1991.
Enacted legislation includes: the Federal Constitution (1993); the RSFSR Law on Foreign
Investments (1991) (giving foreign investors the right to operate wholly-owned Russian sub-
sidiaries); the Law on the Fundamental Principles of the Tax System (1991) (providing a
system of federal, regional, and local taxes); a Patent Act, Trademark Act, and special soft-
ware legislation; a Copyright Act (1993); Part 1 of the Civil Code (1994) (containing general
provisions on company law, legal transactions, securities, and ownership) and more recently
Part 2; the Joint-Stock Company Law (1995); and the Securities Law (1996). See Klaus-
Albert Bauer, Status ofLaw in an 'Emerging Market', 23 INT'L Bus. LAW. 371 (1995).
19The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that for a given point in time one can ac-
curately measure either the velocity or the position of an electron in an atomic orbit, but
never both. As former Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar said in another context, "Russia
today is not a bad subject for long-term prognostication, and a very inappropriate subject for
short-term analysis." David Remnick, Can Russia Change?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1997, at 35,
43.
20 See Natasha Mileusnic, The Great Boardroom Revolution, Moscow TIMEs, July 16,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File [hereinafter Mileusnic, Boardroom
Revolution].
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tions of managerial accountability or fiduciary duty,21 and managers must
now readjust to new power hierarchies. However, managerial animosity
toward outsiders is only partially to blame for the opacity in the financial
information supplied by Russian firms to actual and potential investors.
Other equally instrumental potential reasons for informational deficiencies
are the prospect, again carried over from the Soviet era, of personal gain at
the expense of the State, and evasion of astronomically high tax rates on
businesses.22
The second obstacle is the inadequacy of judicial and administrative
means to check or punish fraudulent transactions on the market and other
violations of established laws.2 In light of the important role played by
policing and enforcement through criminal and civil actions in the U.S.
21 See Cheryl W. Gray, In Search of Owners: Privatization and Corporate Governance in
Transition Economies, WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER, Aug. 1996, at 179, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File ("[S]ocialism inhibited (indeed, often classified as ille-
gal) the development of basic norms and ethics of market conduct and fiduciary responsibil-
ity on which so much behavior in advanced market economies implicitly rests."). The black
market, rampant during the Communist era, was hardly a reservoir of ethical market conduct.
See also Rupert Gordon-Walker, Taming Old Russian Bears, EUROMONEY (Sept. 1996)
<http://www.emwl.com> (citing one western observer to say: "Control is everything....
Managers behave like owners now because that was how they behaved and were expected to
behave in Soviet times. It is important to have an historical perspective.").
22See The Challenges of Raising Capital for Russian Companies through ADRs,
EAST/WEST EXECUTIVE GUIDE, Oct. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File
[hereinafter Challenges of Raising Capital] ("Even with audits, disclosure will be truncated
until the Government of the Russian Federation enacts a modem tax code that invites tax
compliance, not evasion, thus facilitating disclosure."); Scott Studebaker, Russia and For-
eign Investors, the View Beyond the Elections, EAST/WEsT EXECUTrVE GUIDE, May 1, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File ("With many Russian companies, if they are
trying to hide something, it is not necessarily from investors, but from the Russian tax
authorities. Many companies have two sets of books: one for foreign investors or major in-
vestors, and another for Russian tax authorities."); Lee, Russian Winter, supra note 16 ("Few
Russian companies are open about their results, their profitability, even what other compa-
nies they own, for fear of being hit with high tax demands from the government.").
Regarding the uncertainty and unpredictability of the Russian tax system for foreign in-
vestors, see David F. Black, So Do You Want to Invest in Russia? A Legislative Analysis of
the Foreign Investment Climate in Russia, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 123, 141-148 (1996).
2With respect to courts, their inefficacy at resolving commercial disputes stems from
their grounding in Soviet laws and legal methods. See Gray, supra note 21 (During the So-
viet era, "[lI]egal frameworks defining property rights, private contract regimes, fiduciary li-
ability, dispute resolution mechanisms, and rules of entry and exit for private firms
atrophied. Courts lost much, if not all, of their independence as well as their role as adjudi-
cators of commercial disputes and enforcers of commercial laws.").
More recently, it has been noted that the FCSM "lacks the enforcement power enjoyed by
its Western counterparts in respect of conducting investigations and in levying fines and
penalties on wayward market participants." Yuri Golovanov, Issues in Russia's Emerging
Securities Market, E. EuR. Bus. L., Nov. 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File. See Lee, Russian Winter, supra note 16, at 52 ("The Russian SEC is good at producing
regulations but has almost no capacity to enforce them or penalize recalcitrant companies.").
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conception of securities regulation, the deficiency of judicial and adminis-
trative institutions in Russia threatens to render impotent the elaborate
regulatory structure of the 1996 Securities Law.
Finally, a strong and well-financed commercial banking sector has
grown up alongside a comparatively weak and disorganized pool of securi-
ties firms.24 At least one observer has argued, with good reason, that absent
decisive regulatory intervention, Russia will develop a bank-dominated
system, similar in various respects to the German and Japanese models.2 5
As a consequence, Russia runs the danger of failing to develop strong do-
mestic capital markets and therefore facilitating government intervention in
the market.2 6 The regulatory model espoused by the 1996 Securities Law
risks catalyzing this process by ignoring its evolution and imposing the
right sort of regulation for the wrong market.
A. Russian Corporate Management: Learning by Doing
Privatization in Russia has produced two adversarial forces in the arena
of corporate control. On one side are the institutional investors who de-
mand the right to protect and manage the holdings they acquired during pri-
vatization. On the other side are entrenched Soviet-era directors who fight
to remain in control of "their" companies, 27 and do not hesitate to use in-
timidation, personal connections with the Russian government, and outright
fraud to achieve their goal.28 One method used by these directors relies on
convincing or coercing employees to place their shares into a long-term
trust from which they cannot be withdrawn and through which the man-
agement can vote such shares.2 9 Other abuses of managerial authority have
included the deletion of outside shareholder stakes from company regis-
ters3" and massive unpublicized share dilutions.31 A notorious example of
24See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Of Brokers, Banks and the Case for Regulatory Intervention
in the Russian Securities Markets, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 185, 194 (1996) [hereinafter Brown,
Brokers, Banks]; Olga Proskurina, Lower-Tier Russian Shares to Be Promoted, Moscow
NEws, Oct. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
25See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 194.26Id. at 220.
27See Neela Banerjee, Russia to Get Tough With Tax Evaders, WALL ST. J., July 31,
1996, at A10. ("Company revenues are often diverted to lavish projects or to the bank ac-
counts of management, who usually have no powerful shareholders to answer to.").
2
9 See Mileusnic, Boardroom Revolution, supra note 20.
29 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 1951.
30One particularly vivid example was the 1994 decision by Krasnoyarks Aluminum to
delete from its share register the entire 20% stake held by the British Trans World Group.
See Mileusnic, Boardroom Revolution, supra note 20; Russian Share Registries Come Under
Scrutiny, Russ. & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Feb. 26, 1997, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwid File.
31 For example, the Komineft oil company diluted the holdings of foreign shareholders by
delaying for nine months its announcement of an $18 million share increase in its charter
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dilution occurred in October 1996, when Surgut Holding announced that it
had issued and assumed ownership of 500 million new shares of common
stock in its oil operating subsidiary Surgutneffigaz. In the process, Surgut
Holding increased its stake in the subsidiary from 38% to 43.5%, at the
same time the share price dropped by 17% on the announcement date.32
Few outside shareholders are prepared to battle the entrenched Russian
managers. Illiquid markets, informational deficiencies, and insider tenacity
have made the Russian corporate sector a minefield not worth entering for
most private investors who cannot "vote with their feet" at the first sign of
insider dealing.3 3 Even some of the largest Russian commercial banks have
found asserting control difficult. In one recent skirmish, Uneximbank
sought the help of Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin to oust the chair-
man of Norilsk Nickel, a mining company in which Uneximbank had pur-
chased a controlling stake in the loans-for-shares auction of 1996. 34
Constraints on insider dealing and securities abuses have come from
both government legislation and the pressures associated with raising capi-
tal. To guard against abuses of so-called "pocket registrars, 3 5 the Joint-
Stock Company Law provides recourse against both issuer and registrar if
deletions of register entries should occur. -6 The 1996 Securities Law like-
wise provides procedural precautions such as a requirement that companies
with more than 500 shareholders use independent share registrars.37 As a
capital. See Russian Share Registries Come Under Scrutiny, supra note 30; Mileusnic,
Boardroom Revolution, supra note 20. Similar dilutions were done by Primorsky Shipping
and the Far East Shipping Company. It has been speculated that pressure from the FCSM
forced Komineft to nullify the entire issue. Id.3 2 See Peter Lee, Taking Stock of Russian Equities, EUROMONEY, Jan. 10, 1997, at 63, 68
[hereinafter Lee, Russian Equities]. The dilution took place just seven months after another
incident in which Surgutneftigaz, following a Presidential edict permitting parent companies
to establish 100% control over their units, offered shareholders of one of its refinery units a
share swap that significantly diluted their equity value with no compensation for the loss.
See Neela Banejee, Russian Oil Firm's Share Swap Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28,
1996, at A10.33See Gray, supra note 21. Gray finds that a weak market squeezes out so-called "pas-
sive" shareholders; these shareholders sell their stakes to "discipline managers," leaving only
"active" shareholders behind to vote their shares and exercise control. In Russia, active
monitoring and control by large, dynamic shareholders is likely to be the trend for the near
term.34See Wild East Remains Untamed, EUROMONEY, Sept. 30, 1996, at 271. The auction
gave Uneximbank a 38% stake in the company. See Russia: Russiamoney - Locked Assets,
EUROMONEY CENT. EuR., Oct. 31, 1996, at 36.35"Pocket registrar" refers to a registrar who is controlled or influenced by a particular
issuer. See Russian Share Registries Come Under Scrutiny, supra note 30.36 Joint-Stock Company Law, supra note 5.
371996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 8(1). In addition, registrars are forbidden to
engage in brokering or other operations on the securities market. See Russian Share Regis-
tries Come Under Scrutiny, supra note 30.
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result, some of the primary investor concerns over the registration of shares,
custodial services, and settlement of trades have been allayed to a large ex-
tent.
38
Legislative reforms provide only a partial explanation for the reduction
in managerial malfeasance, nor can Russia rely exclusively on legislation to
curtail marketplace abuses. Two additional factors have played a role in
checking opportunistic behavior and reducing the risks to investors. First,
several Western investment banks have begun offering custodial services by
signing contracts with local registrars.3 9 These contractual arrangements
allow the investment banks to monitor registrars, to require registrars to
meet a specified standard of service, and to be held accountable for losses
which occur through their fault.4 ° In providing custodial services, foreign
banks boost investor confidence in the securities market by offering experi-
ence and economies of scale which comparable Russian institutions have
been previously unable to offer.41
The second factor limiting market abuses has been the need of Russian
firms for foreign capital. This impetus above all seems to be responsible
for the favorable correction in corporate attitudes toward disclosure and
compliance with outside shareholder interests. As one commentator put it,
[o]nly two years ago most Russian directors regarded data about
their companies (including the amount of charter capital) as a commer-
cial secret. Any investor who did not pledge to put money into a fac-
tory immediately after his first visit was looked down upon. And new
shareholders were rarely welcomed to participate in company manage-
ment. Fortunately, such an attitude is changing.42
The change has come about because of enforcement that can best be
viewed as reputational. Russian companies now realize that they need large
inflows of capital to survive.43 They also understand that a corporate his-
3 8See Tim Hyam, Reducing Risks in Russia, GLOBAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1996, at 3. The in-
vestors' concerns were understandable; in many companies, "physical book entry of the in-






41 See Lee, Russian Equities, supra note 32, at 64:
Large foreign investors have the option of using local brokers, buying sharesthrough them as beneficial owners but allowing the local shares to remain held in the
broker's name on the company's share register. That exposes investors to the risk of
the broker collapsing. To their intense frustration, many Russian brokers find that, for
all their specialist knowledge, they are too thinly capitalized to be acceptable counter-
parties for institutional investors.
a2 Proskurina, supra note 24.
4 3 Deputy chairman of the FCSM Alexander Kolesnikov stated: "About 40% of our com-
panies tell us they are ready to reveal any information in order to raise money." Wild East
Remains Untamed, supra note 34. The larger Russian companies, such as Rostelecom, are
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tory marred by stock dilution or registry fraud will harm their ability to
raise money in the international capital markets; by contrast, a reputation
for integrity and openness is rewarded with foreign investment.44
One result of this sea-change is a kind of race to disclose on the part of
the largest Russian companies, despite the tax considerations that keep
many companies' financial statements opaque.45 While even these large
companies do not provide enough information to qualify for public offer-
ings in the United States, which would require at least three years of GAAP
statements and high levels of due diligence, many 6 are providing sufficient
disclosure to offer Level 1 American Depository Receipts ("ADRs")47 and
said to need billions of dollars each over a number of years. See Lee, Russian Winter, supra
note 16, at 52-53.
4A prime example is the Komineft stock dilution. See supra note 32. In the aftermath,
the company apologized and sent its economic team on a "goodwill tour" of London and
New York. See Wild East Remains Untamed, supra note 34. It has been estimated that for-
eign direct investment in Russia will reach U.S. $27 billion between 1996 and 2000, al-
though this number is less than China currently receives in a single year. See Brian Caplen,
Fund Managers Betting Big on Russian Prospects, AsIAN Bus., Aug. 1996, at 7-9.45See supra text accompanying note 22; Colin Barraclough, Are Bankers Kidding Them-
selves About Russia?, INsTrUrIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1997, at 49, 52.46 Such companies include: Lukoil (Russia's largest vertically integrated oil company);
Seversky Tube Works (a supplier of pipe and casing for Russia's oil and gas companies);
Torgovy Dom GUM (the operating company for a large Moscow department store); Tatneft
(a Tatarstan oil company); Inkombank (the fifth largest Russian commercial bank); and
Chernogomeft (an oil company). At least seven other large banks and firms are in the proc-
ess of receiving or have already secured SEC approval for ADR issues. See Challenges of
Raising Capital, supra note 22.47In brief, an ADR is the instrument created when one or more shares purchased by U.S.
customers through their brokers from a foreign issuer are held in their original form by a
sub-custodian agent of a U.S. depository, and the depository repackages the shares into
ADRs for sale to the U.S. customer.
Under Rule 12g3-2(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R § 240.12g3-
2(b), Level 1 ADRs are exempt from the otherwise obligatory § 12(g) registration
requirements (15 U.S.C. § 781(g)), provided that the issuer or government official or agency
of the country in which it is domiciled and incorporated or organized furnishes to the SEC:
information in each of the following categories the issuer since the beginning of its last
fiscal year (A) has made or is required to make public pursuant to the law of the country
of its domicile or in which it is incorporated or organized, (B) has filed or is required to
file with a stock exchange on which its securities are traded and which was made public
by such exchange, or (C) has distributed or is required to distribute to its security hold-
ers.
17 C.F.R § 240.12g3-2(b)(1)(i) (1997). The rule further requires the provision of such in-
formation during each subsequent fiscal year, when such information becomes available. 17
C.F.R § 240.12g3-2(b)(1)(iii). The SEC has loosely described the information it seeks as:
information material to an investment decision such as: the financial condition or results
of operations; changes in business; acquisitions or dispositions of assets; issuance, re-
demption, or acquisitions of their securities; changes in management or control; the
granting of options or the payment of other remuneration to directors or officers; and
transactions with directors, officers or principal security holders.
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at least one firm has offered Level 3 American Depository Shares through
the New York Stock Exchange.48
Level 1 ADRs have provided both advantages and drawbacks for Rus-
sian issuers. The diminished disclosure requirements allow Russian issuers
to gain exposure to global markets and potential foreign direct investment at
a lower overall cost of entry.49 However, because the securities trade over
the counter, they suffer from limited liquidity, and issuers need market
makers to cultivate investor interest.50 This complication aside, whatever
benefits ADRs offer to Russian companies and sophisticated investors, the
larger question is whether the preoccupation with ADRs and international
capital markets furthers the development of Russian securities markets and
investor participation.
The advancement of Russian capital markets appears to be a marginal
consideration in the current rush to offer equity abroad. Domestic issues
which might give impetus to the reevaluation and gradual maturation of
Russian securities regulation have not, for the present, inspired the spending
power or confidence of the general population, despite the allegedly mas-
sive savings rate of ordinary Russians.51 Unlike those of other countries,
Russian government debt securities are not popular with individual inves-
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(3). The words "such as" suggest that the list provides a nonex-
elusive informational "floor," and that the information required of the issuer by its home
government or provided to an exchange at least inquires as to this basic data.
Once the ADR is registered with the SEC, the ADR becomes legally the issuance of the
entity deemed to be created by the contract between the foreign company and the U.S. de-
pository bank, rather than of either one of them separately. For a good, clear explanation of
the concept behind ADRs/GDRs see Joseph Velli, American Depository Receipts: An Over-
view, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S38 (1994).48See Seth Schiesel, The Russians Are Coming, to Big Board Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 1996, at D6 (describing the IPO and listing on the NYSE of VimpelCom, a Russian cel-
lular communications company). VimpelCom sold 5.4 million American Depository Shares
in the IPO. See Russia: Emerging Securities Markets, Russia, EUROMONEY, Jan. 31, 1997, at
38. 49See Challenges of Raising Capital, supra note 22.
50Id. In addition, many large U.S. institutional investors, such as pension funds, cannot
invest in Level 1 securities because of their inadequate disclosure levels.
5'The Russian State Committee for Statistics ("GOSKOMSTAT") has pegged the cu-
mulative volume of savings for 1995 at 214 trillion rubles, or 22.7% of income. See Struc-
ture of Savings Among the Population, Russ. & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Sept. 24,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. In order of preference, the favorite
means of saving among the general population have been: (1) purchase of foreign currency
(R135 trillion); (2) bank deposits, two-thirds of which are with the main federal savings bank
Sberbank (R46 trillion); and (3) cash in hand (R33 trillion). Id. This figure is disputed by
various commentators who question GOSKOMSTAT's method of calculation, and instead
calculate the true savings rate to be around 9%. See Press Conference with Richard Layard,
Professor, London School Of Economics, on the Current Economic Situation in Russia, Of-
ficial Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Mar. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Allwld File.
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tors, 2 and the principal investment in stocks by the population ended with
the conclusion of voucher privatization in July 1994.5 Ordinary investors
have become exceptionally risk-averse after their savings were wiped out
by the 1992-1993 bouts of hyper-inflation, by the government's monetary
responses, 54 and by the 1994 collapse of the MMM pyramid scheme.
These experiences begin to explain the popular apathy toward the more
profitable investment opportunities in Russia. In addition, investors are
rightfully wary of proven managerial hostility toward outside shareholders
and the resulting information inefficiencies that render most corporate secu-
rities highly illiquid. The 1996 Securities Law and collateral regulations is-
sued by the FCSM seem to be aimed at this lack of information and high
degree of risk aversion among the general investor populace.
Despite regulatory initiatives by the FCSM, the largest and financially
most transparent Russian issuers continue to raise capital in the intema-
tional markets.56 The size and illiqiuidity of the Russian market 7 and the
specter of unchecked insider trading"s have not only kept retail domestic in-
vestors away, but have also resulted in capital flight at the rate of U.S. $10
billion a year, with the aggregate estimated amount of offshore funds be-
tween U.S. $40 and $100 billion.59 Even more worrisome is the trend to-
52This despite the fact that they are the most liquid securities trading on the Russian mar-
kets, with yields running to 70%. See Andrew Burchill, Is Russia Ready for Mutual Funds?,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 31, 1996, at 85.531d. In the course of voucher privatization, investors could purchase shares with vouch-
ers rather than with cash. The privatization process did not result in widespread ownership
of Russian corporate equity: one study concluded that 19% of Russians working for privat-
ized firms obtained 56% of the equity sold through June 1994, while the 81% of Russians
with vouchers obtained only 15% of the equity. See Joseph Blasi, Russian Privatization:
Ownership, Governance, and Restructuring, in RussiA: CREATING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
AND EFFIcI rr MARKETS (Ira Lieberman & John Nellis eds., 1994), cited in Gray, supra note
21.
54See Caplen, supra note 44.
55For further discussion of the MMM pyramid scheme, see infra note 87.56At the beginning of 1997, ADRs already accounted for a substantial portion of the out-
standing equity of many well-known Russian companies: 24% of Mosenergo; 20% of Lu-
koil; 17% of Chemogomeft; 15% of Seversky Tube Works; and 21% of VimpelCom. This
contradicts the wisdom that "ADRs should become a less important vehicle for trading in
Russian equity as the local market develops more robust infrastructure, better regulation and
larger domestic investors." See Lee, Russian Equities, supra note 32.
57During the second half of 1996, the top 10 companies trading on the Russian Trading
System ("RTS") accounted for U.S. $22 billion, or roughly two-thirds, of its total capitaliza-
tion of U.S. $33.9 billion. See Proskurina, supra note 24.
58See Lee, Russian Equities, supra note 32 ("There is almost nothing to prevent insider
trading in Russia. Prices can move dramatically on thin volumes.").
59See Caplen, supra note 44. Another figure, provided by Interpol and Russian Interior
Ministry, suggests that Russians have salted away more than U.S. $300 billion in foreign
banks, most of which left the country illegally and untaxed. See Remnick, supra note 19, at
37.
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ward debt financing; on the heels of a successful Russian government
Eurobond issue in November 1996, many Russian companies have begun to
consider and execute similar debt issues in the global marketplace, insofar
as they would not involve ceding any additional control to foreign outside
shareholders and would be easier to justify politically.60 In response, the
chairman of the FCSM, Dmitry Vasilyev, stated: "[W]e should not forget
that we should try to lure the market back and that the Eurobonds and the
ADRs, American Depositary Receipts, cannot be the mainstream trend of
the Russian market. We need the market here and now, in Russia.,
61
Managerial fear of losing control and reticence to disclose is only part
of the problem, however. The shape of the market and the incentives of of-
fering equity to foreign investors are rooted in other causes as well, one of
which is the deficiency of judicial enforcement of the laws currently in
place.
B. Enforcement
Within its emphasis on systematic disclosure,62 the 1996 Securities
Law owes more of its heritage to the U.S. securities laws of the New Deal
than to the regulatory regimes of any other country or period.63 Since be-
fore the New Deal, the U.S. philosophy of securities regulation has been
based on the provision of continuous, accurate, public disclosure as a rem-
6°See Peter Lee, The Russians are Here- At Last, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1997, at 60 [herein-
after Lee, The Russians are Here]. Sound economics also underlie the predilection to issue
debt abroad. The cost of capital is substantially more expensive in Russia than in interna-
tional markets, despite the sharp fall in interest rates since 1996. The cost of debt financing
internally is between 15% and 20%; by contrast, the cost of debt for Russian companies in-
ternationally is estimated to be between 9.5% and 11%. See The Year of the Bond,
EUROMONEY, Apr. 1997, at 90.61 Press Conference with Dmitry Vasilyev, Chair, Federal Commission for the Securities
Market, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Mar. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File [hereinafter March 5 Press Conference].
62Press Conference with Dmitry Vasilyev, Chair, Federal Commission for the Securities
Market, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, July 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allwld File [hereinafter July 5 Press Conference].6
1See infra Part I.C. An article published on REDGAR, an Internet database similar to
the U.S. SEC's EDGAR and developed as a joint venture between the FCSM and the Rus-
sian Institute of Commercial Engineering, highlights the link between the U.S. and Russian
systems. See "Materialy Po Probleme Sozdania Na Rossiyskom Rynke Tsennykh Bumag
Sistemy Raskrytiya Informatsii" (Materials on the Problem of Creating a System of Infor-
mation Disclosure on the Russian Securities Market) (visited Mar. 20, 1997)
<http://www.fe.msk.ru/infomarket/redgar/disclosure/post4.html>. After seven decades dur-
ing which truthful, accurate information about Russian society was systematically hidden
from the outside world and the Russian population, it is interesting, if a bit jarring, to see
Justice Brandeis' analogy of publicity (here meaning disclosure) to disinfecting sunlight re-
stated by a Russian official. See Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How Tim
BANKERS USE IT 33 (1933).
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edy against fraud64 and as a way to reduce risk associated with the purchase
and sale of securities.65 Many debates regarding the utility of the U.S. dis-
closure approach take as a given the presence of adequate enforcement
mechanisms as the backdrop to such regulation. Yet, the problem of en-
forcement was the principal catalyst for the adoption of the 1933 and 1934
Acts. Between 1911 and 1933, forty-seven states and the territory of Ha-
waii enacted securities regulation statutes, or "blue sky laws. 66 Such laws
proved deficient because their jurisdictional reach was confined to the bor-
ders of their respective states, while much of the actionable securities fraud
was characteristically multi-state.67
Problems of enforcement in Russia have less to do with jurisdictional
limitations than with judicial inexperience in resolving commercial dis-
putes. When the U.S. Congress passed the 1933 and 1934 Acts, federal
judges possessed abundant experience in deciding matters of contract law as
well as issues of fraud, and in resolving disputes between corporations and
shareholders. If judges lacked experience in one area of law, they could
frequently rely on precedent.
Russian courts provide a stark contrast. Whereas the enforcement of
the legal documents for securities issues and sale and purchase agreements
requires a solid knowledge of private contract law and training in contrac-
tual interpretation, Russian courts often lack such proficiency and training.
Commercial transactions between private parties were only recently
legalized after almost seventy years of suppression, and even criminaliza-
tion, of private trade and commerce. As a result, Russia suffers both from a
lack of legal institutions with a credible history of contract enforcement and
from the lack of a business culture that could provide a general source for a
reputation-based sanctioning system.68
64See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. Conp. L. 1, 18-33 (1983) [hereinafter Seligman, Disclosure System].65See id. at 52-53:
The assumption that investors will be more willing to purchase securities when
compulsory disclosure of material information reduces the incidence of fraud, increases
the reliability of estimates of firm value, or reduces the volatility of securities price
swings is an articulation of the familiar financial theory of risk aversion.... By reduc-
ing the perceived risk of corporate securities, compulsory disclosure would tend to re-
duce the risk premia that issuers selling new securities would have to pay, thus
increasing the funds available for economic growth. Reduction of investors' concerns
that securities fraud waves periodically may drive down securities price levels will tend
to increase propensities to save. And reductions in the volatility of market price swings




68Katharina Pistor, Supply and Demand for Contract Enforcement in Russia: Courts, Ar-
bitration, and Private Enforcement, 22 REv. CENT. & E. EuR. L. 55,57 (1996).
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Application of the U.S. securities regulation regime, so closely emu-
lated by the Russian drafters of the 1996 Securities Law, has often hinged,
in the United States, on judicial interpretation of complex statutory provi-
sions and hair-splitting distinctions on the adequacy - or "materiality" -
of misrepresentations or omissions in disclosed information.69 The Russian
courts are far from able to attempt such rigorous analysis. The courts that
would have direct authority over cases involving entrepreneurs, private or-
ganizations, or state organs are the so-called Arbitrazh Courts, or courts of
arbitration. 70 These courts are lineal descendants of the state arbitrazh sys-
tem ("Gosarbitrazh") which served as a state-administered tribunal for the
resolution of conflicts between state enterprises arising from the imple-
mentation of Soviet-era economic plans.71 Despite the change in their pur-
pose and function, the personnel of Gosarbitrazh remains predominantly
unchanged in the Arbitrazh courts.72 And as senior judges themselves occa-
sionally admit, they are poorly equipped to resolve modem commercial dis-
putes based on paradigms that were considered heretical when they were
studying and beginning to practice law.73
A number of other barriers exist to U.S.-style judicial enforcement of
Russian securities laws. First, because Russia is a civil law country, its
courts will have difficulty mitigating the effects of poorly drafted or contra-
dictory statutes through a process familiar to common law jurists as "inter-
69See, e.g., TSC Indust., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (establishing a defi-
nition of materiality for proxy statement disclosure under the 1934 Act); S.E.C. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (determining the outer boundaries of the private placement
exemption under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (explicating the duty of "due diligence" under § 11 of the 1933 Act).70Their name belies their role: Arbitrazh courts are not engaged in "arbitration" in the
American legal sense. Arbitration is sometimes initiated in special industry-specific tribu-
nals known as tertiary courts, and roughly 90% of all cases filed with these courts end up
being enforced by the Arbitrazh courts. See Pistor, supra note 68, at 71-73.
7 1Id. at 68-69. The Arbitrazh courts originated with the "Zakon RF 'Ob arbitrazhnom
Sude"' (Law on Arbitrazh Courts), July 4, 1991, as amended June 24, 1992 and July 7, 1993,
in Zakon No. 2, Feb. 1993, and the "Arbitrazhnyj protsessual'nyj kodeks Rossiyskoj Fed-
eratsii" (Arbitrazh Procedural Code), Zakon No. 7, July 1992. Both laws were superceded
by the Law on Arbitrazh courts of Apr. 28, 1995 ("Ob arbitrazhnykh sudakh v Rossiiskoj
Federatsii,") Sobr. Zakonod. RF, No. 18, Item 1589; and by the Arbitrazh Procedural Code
of May 5, 1995 ("Arbitrazlnyj protsessual'nyj kodeks Rossiyskoj Federatsii"), edomosti
Fed. Sobr. RF, No. 15, Item 588, May 1995.
72See Pistor, supra note 68, at 69.
73See, for example, the statement of the first vice-president of the Supreme Court of Ar-
bitration, Mikhail Yukov: "This share business is too complicated for us. We don't under-
stand it." Elif Kaban, Shares, Guns and Bodyguards in Russia's Courts, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, May 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. See also Steve Li-
esman, et al., Rethinking an Empire: The New Russia, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1996, at Al
("[Russian] courts can barely enforce a weak constitutional and legal system.")
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stitial legislation." 74 Second, the courts, like many other institutions, in-
cluding the FCSM, lack adequate funds and staff.75 Third, many Russians
view with distrust courts that dispensed justice under Soviet laws prior to
1991.76 Even if this were not a potential consideration, the problem is com-
pounded by the recognition that many transactions are semi-legal to begin
with: contracts drawn up with the most rudimentary provisions are pre-
sumed to stand in for a second, more detailed unofficial contract the pur-
pose of which is to evade taxes or conceal certain elements of a transaction
that might render the contract legally unenforceable and possibly induce
criminal sanctions against the signatories.77
Lastly, to dispel the notion that the problem of enforcement is entirely
attributable to flawed courts, a substantial part of the enforcement difficulty
is due to the nature of statutory drafting in Russia. New laws typically do
not explicitly amend or repeal prior laws. Instead, a statute may state that
provisions of old laws are ineffective to the extent that they contradict the
new statute.78 If the interpretation of even the clearest of rules must be set
74See Shirley Goldstein & Mary Holland, Post-Soviet Economies Forged in Crucible of
Legal Change: New Nations Radically Alter Their Regimes, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1996, at S2.
Unfortunately, this is not the only drawback companies face under civil law regimes. In a
recent article, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
Vishny argue that countries adhering to an English common-law legal regime are signifi-
cantly more protective of shareholders' and creditors' rights than countries with legal sys-
tems based on German or French civil law. In addition, common-law countries are better at
enforcing the laws on their books. By consequence, common-law countries enjoy higher-
valued stockmarkets (as a percentage of GNP) as well as a larger number of initial public of-
ferings. See Rafael La Porta, et al., 52 Legal Determinants of Corporate Finance 1131 (July
1, 1997), available in 1997 WL 12797147.
In Russia, unlike other civil law countries, the development of legal concepts underlying
the capital markets halted soon after the 1917 Revolution. Consequently, as late as 1994,
Russian civil law scholars would fall back on Russian civil law concepts prevalent in the
first three decades of the twentieth century to define, for example, the property rights im-
plicit in a common share. This flawed foundation is yet another obstacle to the rapid devel-
opment of securities regulation in Russia. See Andrei A. Baev, Implications of Emerging
Legal Structures for Capital Markets in Russia, 2 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 211, 234-38 &
n.97 (1996).
75See Jonas Bernstein, Murder in Moscow, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1996, at A22. It is un-
clear to what extent this currently hamstrings Russian Arbitrazh courts: despite being legally
bound to decide economic disputes within two months after a claim is filed, see Pistor, supra
note 68, at 75, the number of economic disputes at such courts dropped significantly between
1991 and 1994, and does not correlate with an overall decline in production among regions.
Id. at 71, 80-81.
76See Pistor, supra note 68, at 80 ("Parties may hesitate to make use of a system that
evokes memories of the past regime.").
77Id. at 83.
7 8See Bauer, supra note 18, at 372. For example, as the new Russian Civil Code was
being enacted piecemeal, sections of the 1964 Code remained in effect to the extent that new
provisions had not been enacted to replace them. See Lane H. Blumenfeld, Russia's New
Civil Code: The Legal Foundation for Russia's Emerging Market Economy, 30 INr'L LAW.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:111 (1997)
against prior rules to ascertain how much of the old remains a part of the
new, the Arbitrazh courts may face a vast legal morass that spawns other-
wise unnecessary litigation.79 Or, the courts may find themselves largely
ignored, as they are today.
Administrative enforcement is hardly more effective, though perhaps
more for reasons of inadequate resources than for a lack of familiarity with
the commercial setting. From the time it was established in November
1994 through the time of this writing, the FCSM has lacked the power to
investigate and enforce its regulations on a par with the U.S. Securities Ex-
change Commission ("SEC").80 The FCSM hopes to push through amend-
ments to the Civil-Procedural Code that would outline a mechanism for
class action lawsuits." In the meantime, the FCSM has urged investors to
resolve their complaints through the courts rather than through complaints
to government officials, 82 a solution hardly meaningful for defrauded in-
vestors, but necessary if a civil enforcement system is ever to take root in
Russia. 3
477, 487 (1996). This vestigial interstitial role for Soviet-era laws is particularly trouble-
some because civil codes enjoy semiconstitutional status in civil law societies such as Rus-
sia. Id. at 487-488. The reconciliation of one Civil Code based on the principles of a
command economy and another based on the freedom of contract would baffle any jurist, no
matter how experienced.
79 See id. It is a common argument that the more certainty a law and its accumulated in-
terpretation provide as to the likely outcome in a dispute, the less parties are inclined to ex-
pend resources on litigation. Instead, parties will prefer out-of-court settlement. See Pistor,
supra note 68, at 64. However, in Russia, contracting parties seem to prefer the uncertainty
of private dispute resolution to the unpredictability of a judicial ruling. Such alternative
means of arbitration often rely on extralegal and violent methods of enforcement. As one
Russian executive noted, "unfortunately, the only lawyer in this country is the Kalashnikov.
People mostly solve their problems in this way. In this country there is no respect for the
law, no culture of law, no judicial system - it's just being created." Remnick, supra note
19, at 36.
80See March 5 Press Conference, supra note 61. Vasilyev noted that the FCSM was
working on a draft law that would give it such investigatory powers. He also noted that the
1997 federal budget allocated funds only for the remuneration of FCSM employees, leaving
"not akopeck" for the development of the infrastructure of the stock market. Id. Elsewhere,
somewhat cryptically, Vasilyev confessed that "[the] commission will always have less
authority than the American one because of the tradition of Russian legislation." See Mile-
usnic, Boardroom Revolution, supra note 20. The FCSM currently lacks the power to pun-
ish company managers and intermediaries for violating investors' rights. Its powers are
limited to reprimanding a company that violates such rights, or withdrawing a license from a
market participant. See Russia's Securities Commission Wants More Power, REuTERs FIN.
SERVICE, Apr. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. However, the new
Russian Criminal Code now criminalizes securities fraud (in § 185, see infra note 165) and
operating on the securities market without a license (in § 171).
81 See March 5 Press Conference, supra note 61.
82 See Thornhill, supra note 6.
83In effect, Chairman Vasilyev's urgings that investors use the courts to resolve their
disputes is an attempt to end a catch-22 situation: until investors make effective use of the
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C. Commercial Banks
Arguably, the greatest threats to the FCSM's establishment of a mean-
ingful securities market in Russia are not managerial abuses on the market
or the ineffectiveness of various enforcement institutions, but rather the
market's potential irrelevance. On the heels of voucher privatization, large
Russian commercial banks have engaged in transactions in securities. Their
entry has heightened the possibility that, absent a form of Glass-Steagal
8 4
separation between commercial and investment banking activity, Russia
will develop a financing system similar to that in Japan and Continental
European countries such as Germany.85
The development of the commercial banking sector in Russia should
be viewed in tandem with the lackluster growth of native investment funds
and brokerage houses.8 6 Part of the reason for this lack of investment funds
and brokerage houses is attributable to a high degree of risk aversion among
Russians. Many remember losing their savings to poorly managed, illiquid
voucher funds at the start of privatization, and to the collapse of Sergei
Mavrodi's MMM pyramid scheme during the summer of 1994.87
courts, the courts will continue to be ignored as useless and ineffectual. Hence Vasilyev's
statement, "When we have several cases resolved through the courts, it will change behavior
and we will gain experience working with the court system." Brad Durham, Pressure on the
System, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1997, at 95, 97.84The popular name for the Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), which prohibited banks from engaging in many
securities-related activities.
85This notion is essentially the thesis of J. Robert Brown's Brokers, Banks article, supra
note 24.
8
6Id. at 200 ("[D]espite their rapid evolution, even the elite [securities] firms have not
developed the placement power or reputation necessary to take control of the primary distri-
bution process.").
See Gray, supra note 21:
The Russian privatization program favored insiders but also allowed the free entry
of private investment funds. Although some 600 funds were formed, they were kept
much smaller than [comparable] Czech funds, and thus they have far less power and in-
fluence. In the Russian environment, with no legal safeguards, less macroeconomic
discipline, and strong insider control, the goals of the funds are far from clear... . Only
a minority appear interested in owning and improving the performance of enterprises in
the economy (citation omitted).87 See Andrew Burchill, Russia: Mutual Funds - People's Capitalism Comes to Russia,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 31, 1997, at 23. The MMM '"mutual fund" was promoted
through saturation advertising. With no other statutory tools at hand, the Russian govern-
ment prosecuted the fund's creator, Sergei Mavrodi, on charges of tax evasion. There the
resemblance to the prosecution of Al Capone ends. Mavrodi was exonerated, and thereafter
won a seat in the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament. See Wild East Remains
Untamed, supra note 34. With respect to the absence of legal grounds to prosecute MMM,
see Mikhail Dubik, Laws Too Vague to Take on MMM, Moscow TIMES, July 28, 1994, at 1.
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Most Russian banks avoided becoming tainted by such abuses.88 Be-
ginning in 1990, many secured their capital by reorganizing as joint-stock
companies and issuing shares to the public.8 9 Many banks, moreover, were
formed out of former Soviet ministries, and thus retained significant con-
nections to, as well as input from, government officials. 90 Others were cre-
ated by formerly state-owned enterprises, and thus had ready corporate
clients as "borrowers," some of which are giants in their respective indus-
tries even on a global scale.91
As Russian securities firms played second fiddle to Western invest-
ment funds,92 Russian banks assembled vast industrial conglomerates into
Financial Industrial Groups ("FIGs"), typically structured as a bank hub
surrounded by various production, distribution, and retail concerns.93 One
example is the Uneximbank empire, which includes holdings in metal proc-
essing, auto making, retail distribution, mining, and other industries.9 An-
other, the Rosprom FIG, grouped around Menatep Bank, "owns controlling
stakes in more than thirty companies in the construction, food, textile,
mining, and chemicals industries." 95  These groupings now compete in
many separate sectors of the Russian economy: Most & Stolichny banks in
retail banking; Menatep & Uneximbank in the chemical industry; Most and
88See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 209. Both domestically and abroad, the
banks were perceived as being subject to heightened regulatory oversight and consequently




91 For example, Imperial Bank was formed with the assistance of Gazprom, a colossus in
the natural gas industry. Likewise, Gossnab, a government agency, assisted Nefteyugansk
Oil in the formation of Tokobank. Aeroflot, the Russian state airline company, formed
Aeroflotbank. Perhaps the best illustration of the close relationship between corporations
and banks is provided by Rossiisky Kredit, which had as shareholders the Tula Weapons
Factory, the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Factory, the Molniya Research and Production Asso-
ciation, the Prioksky Non-ferrous Metal Factory, the Kotlass Pulp-and-Paper Combine, the
Voskresensk Mashinostroitel Plant, Moscow's Orbita-Servis Association, and the Novocher-
kassk Electrode Factory. See id. at 205 & n. 113. Such shareholding patterns are typical of
Russian Financial Industrial Groups ("FIGs"). See infra text accompanying notes 92-96 &
104-10.
92See Lee, Russian Equities, supra note 32. As the head of research at one Russian bro-
ker put it, "Our job is to discover [viable Russian firms] and bring them to the market. We
are the foot soldiers for the big international investment banks." Id.
93See Therese Raphael, Two Russian Giants Battle Over Reform, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
1996, at A14. For a general overview of Russian FIGs, see Demistifying Russian Financial
Industrial Groups, a report by the American Embassy in Russia, found at
<http://www.iep.doc.gov/bism's/cables/970915ru.htm> (visited Dec. 1, 1997).
94Id.
95See Liesman et al., supra note 73. The government retains a substantial interest in
many of these companies.
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Uneximbank in the credit and debit card markets; and virtually all in the oil
sector.96
The banks and their investment subsidiaries are accomplishing what
Russian stand-alone securities firms and voucher funds have so far failed to
do: they are becoming corporate monitors.97 To a large extent, this moni-
toring is a necessary function in an environment prone to repeated and ex-
tensive insider dealing by corporate managers. However, the bank-
dominated model also involves an inherent conflict of interest: when com-
mercial lenders both provide short-term credit and act as advisers regarding
long-term funding, they are frequently motivated to act in their own best
interests rather than the interests of the companies they serve.98 As self-
interested entities, banks might prefer loans to equity financing, particularly
if new share issues will dilute their stake in a firm. 99 As characteristically
risk-averse institutions, banks focus intensely on the ability to repay, with
collateral and cash flow as primary indicia. °' As fixed claimants, the
banks' risk aversion is enhanced by their conflict with residual claimants
(shareholders) who have a greater incentive to maximize the value of the
firm through risky projects with large potential upsides.1 °1 In bank-
dominated societies such as Japan and Germany, small companies are un-
able to secure badly needed capital either through bank loans or through the
domestic or international capital markets.10 2 In contrast, large companies
have a choice of turning to the international capital markets and listing on
9 6 See Poul Funder Larsen, The Year Big Business Became the State, Moscow TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.97See, for example, Uneximbank's relationship with Norilsk Nickel, text accompanying
note 34. Professor Brown provides a comparable picture:
Overall, [voucher] funds as a check on management represented at best a mixed
blessing. Funds could play a role in displacing former state supported directors, but
were not necessarily driven by the best interests of the company. The majority of funds
were primarily concerned with a quick return on their investments and did not attempt
to improve management skills or long-term profitability.
J. Robert Brown, Order from Disorder: The Development of the Russian Securities Markets,
15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 509, 531-32 (1994) [hereinafter Brown, Order from Disorder].
98See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 217.
99Id. at 217 n.198. An example is Menatep Bank's recent acquisition of a 38% stake in
Yukos, Russia's largest oil company by quantity of reserves. When a recent decree gave
Russian companies with substantial debts to the state and wage arrears the right to issue
shares to cover such payments, Menatep's management was not entirely pleased; its vice-
president stated: "We will be managing the issue, but it is a shame the money cannot be used
more productively, such as for investment in new projects." See Russia: Russiamoney -
Locked Assets, supra note 34.
10°See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 219.
1o1 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Universal Banks are Not the Answer to
America's Corporate Governance "Problem": A Look at Germany, Japan, and the U.S., J.
APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Winter 1997, at 57.
t02See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 218 & n.204.
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foreign exchanges if they do not like the terms offered by domestic lending
institutions.
0 3
Russian bankers and government officials are eager to promulgate the
impression that the development of Russian commercial banks into FIGs
and the cross-shareholding patterns of major industry players is reminiscent
of Japanese keiretsus.'°4 Russia's central bank governor Sergei Dubinin
confirmed that "Russia is closer to the continental European model than the
Anglo-Saxon one. It is an economy with stable industrial groups and large
blocks of shares are controlled by these holdings. This is the real economic
situation here." 10 5 The banks are in a better position to wrap their acquisi-
tions in nationalist sentiment: it is more palatable politically to build strong
Russian-dominated conglomerates than to see Russian companies fall into
the hands of foreign investors.
10 6
'O1°d. at 218.
1°4Yuri Milner, CEO of Alliance-Menatep, the Menatep Group's investment banking
arm, flatly stated that "Menatep and Unexim [banks] have chosen to develop into Japanese-
type organizations." See Russia: Russiamoney - Locked Assets, supra note 34.
1051d.
1'6George Ermolinkin, executive director of the Russian Association of FIGs, noted:
"[Russians] believe in the idea of a powerful Russia and the FIG is the best way to achieve
that. Of course it is not transparent, but I would rather give the shares to Menatep Bank than
some company I had never heard of." Id. Writes Olga Kryshtanovskaya, "The economic in-
terests of the new Russia's business elite determine its basic political values: the idea of
strong centralized state, adherence to patriotism, civil peace and accord, support of strong
groups or monopolies being the utmost expression of Russia's traditional industrial power."
See Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Financial Oligarchy in Russia, RusData Dialine-BizEkon News,
Jan. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, AllwId File.
The controversial "loans-for-shares" transactions in November and December 1995 pro-
vided another example of the exclusion of foreigners. The program allowed high-ranking
Russian banks the right to hold government stakes in some of the largest blue-chip compa-
nies in return for a U.S. $1 billion loan to the government. See Poul Funder Larsen, State
Seeks Loans-for-Shares Deadline Reprieve, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 10, 1996, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. Although the shares were to be returned if the govern-
ment repaid the loans, no one seriously expected repayment to occur. Id. Under the rules of
the loans-for-shares auction, the banks could sell the shares and keep 30% of the capital
gains, with the remainder going to the state. Id. Alternatively, the banks could keep the
shares for a maximum of three years before selling. The program was criticized as a gift for
insiders in which a narrow circle of politically connected banks grabbed up prime equities at
discount prices. In seven of the auctions, foreign bidders were barred from participating. Id.
The swift rise in stock market values since the beginning of 1996 and the high proportion of
the capital gains which the banks would have to surrender to the state proved an obvious
disincentive to the immediate sale of the stakes. Id. Unless the initial rules of the loans-for-
shares scheme are renegotiated, the state's capital gains "cut" either eliminates the banks'
impetus to increase share value, or provides a reason to keep the shares for as long as possi-
ble. Id.
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The acquisitions that the banks made for their FIGs during 1994-1996
are not likely instances of short-term arbitrage. 107 Whatever their long-term
motivations, many have chosen to portray the banks as the most effective
corporate monitors in an economy rife with fraud and corruption. Thus,
one opinion holds:
[T]he groups play a key economic role. With foreign investment at just
$1 billion a year, the government in debt, and Russia's capital markets
too illiquid to tap, the groups are channeling capital, technology, and
new management into enterprises sorely in need of restructuring. Many
observers see the Russian-style zaibatsu as potential engines for spur-
ring an economic revival.
108
While an economic revival is one foreseeable outcome of the moni-
toring and restructuring functions that the banks carry out, the larger ques-
tion is whether the intrinsic conflict of interest between the banks'
monitoring/advisory role and their commercial, self-interested role will
stunt a nascent securities market and foreclose a potentially even more vi-
brant Russian economy. Given the influence that the banks wield in the
government, 0 9 their arguably salutary role with respect to corporate gov-
The stakes purchased during the first round of the loans-for-shares auction are as follows:
BANK COMPANY PERCENTAGE PRICE (U.S.$)
Uneximbank Norilsk Nickel 38% $170m
Uneximbank Sidanko 51% $130m
Menatep Bank Yukos 45% $150m
Menatep Bank Murnansk 23.5% $4.1m
Shipping
Stolichny Bank Sibneft 51% $100.3m (guaranteed
by Menatep Bank)
Imperial Bank Lukoil 5% $35m
Surgut Pension Surgut 40.1% $118.5m (guaranteed
Fund I by Uneximbank)
Russia: Russiamoney - Locked Assets, supra note 34.
107Both Menatep Bank and Uneximbank have declared their intention to retain indefi-
nitely the control of the stakes acquired during the first round of the loans-for-shares auction.
See Russia: Russiarnoney - Locked Assets, supra note 34. For the background of the loans-
for-shares auction, see Larsen, supra note 106.
108Peter Galuszka & Rose Brady, The Battle for Russia's Wealth, Bus. WK., Apr. 1,
1996, at 50, 52.
1'9Their support comes chiefly from the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and vari-
ous members of the Presidential cabinet. After the reelection of President Yeltsin in 1996,
Boris Berezovsky, head of the LogoVaz group, and Vladimire Potanin, the head of Unexim-
bank and its affiliated group, were appointed to high posts in the Russian government, the
former as Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, the latter as First Deputy Prime Minis-
ter. Although Potanin was subsequently sacked, Berezovsky continued to represent the in-
terests of the FIGs in the government until his dismissal on November 5, 1997. See Floriana
Fossato, Russia: Media, Money and Power - An Analysis, RADIo FREE EuR./ RADIO LmERTY,
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ernance, and the nationalist appeal of the FIGs, Russia is prone to develop
relatively weak capital markets. Whether the configuration of the Russian
economy will follow the German or the Japanese model is a matter for
speculation, dependent in part on how intrusively the government chooses
to regulate the size and manner of capital flows to corporations.110 Any se-
curities legislation that Russia adopts is sure to influence how quickly the
securities market develops and what form it eventually takes. A regulatory
paradigm unsuited for the system currently developing in Russia and incog-
nizant of the trends that distinguish it from the U.S. system risks accelerat-
ing its own demise.
II. THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE IN THE RUSSIAN 1996 SECURITIES LAW
To what extent does the 1996 Securities Law and its supporting regu-
lations fit the capital market regime currently evolving in Russia? Does it
take into account the forces that seek to impede the growth of its securities
market, and seek to act against them? Or does it dismiss them? Is a U.S.-
style, disclosure-based system warranted given that the absence of adequate
enforcing institutions and a high level of noncompliance with existing laws
distinguish 1990s Russia from 1930s United States? The remaining sec-
tions of this article will reflect on these issues and focus primarily on the
duty to provide truthful disclosure, as this duty is the acknowledged staple
of both the 1996 Securities Law..1 and the U.S. 1933 and 1934 Acts.
112
While the importance of other provisions such as the prohibition on insider
trading and the regulation of professional market participants is undisputed,
each of these require a separate discussion. In this article, regulatory at-
tempts at establishing a securities market will be cited to the extent that they
Sept. 26, 1997; Chrystia Freeland, Liberal Reformers Persuade Yeltsin to Sack Berezovsky,
FIN. TimIEs, Nov. 6, 1997, at 1.
"'See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 220-232. Whether or not the govern-
ment chooses to erect a form of separation between the banking and securities industries
might not matter: Japan has been able to circumvent a similar separation imposed by the
American Occupation authorities and in effect since the end of the Second World War. Id. at
228-30.
"'See Ukaz Ob Utverzhdenii Kontseptsii Razvitiya Rynka Tsennykh Bumag v Rossi-
yskoj Federatsii No. 1008 [Presidential Decree on the Confirmation of the Concept of the
Development of the Securities Market in the Russian Federation] § 3(4) (July 1, 1996), pub-
lished in Ross. GAZETA, July 5, 1996 [hereinafter Presidential Decree No. 1008].
1
2See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976):
The Securities Act of 1933 ... was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of
material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect
investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing.... The 1934 Act was intended principally
to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transac-
tions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular
reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities ex-
changes.
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further or restrain such endeavors and to the extent that they acknowledge
the three areas already mentioned, namely, shareholders' rights, enforce-
ment problems, and bank dominance.!
1 3
A. The Utility of the U.S. Model
Underpinning the duty of disclosure imposed on businesses and foreign
government issuers by the 1933 and 1934 Acts was the aim of remedying
information asymmetries.1 14 Before and during the Senate Pecora hearings
of 1932-1934, investors were shown to have been repeatedly subjected to
abuses ranging from material omissions in proxy statements to insider
trading to dilution of foreign bonds pledged as security under an indenture
agreement."5 From a more procedural perspective, the enhanced remedies
and safeguards provided by the 1933 and 1934 Acts also stemmed from a
recognition that rules against fraud alone were ineffective in restraining
market abuses if firms chose to be silent.! 16 Absent mandatory disclosure
rules, the cost of obtaining truthful and reasonably complete information
about an issuer of securities would outweigh the benefits of an investment
- unless the intended purchase was of a relatively large or controlling
stake. In contrast, if no one probed for information material to an invest-
ment decision, a potential investor would seek ex ante compensation for the
risk that any undisclosed information, once revealed, would reflect poorly
on the issuer and on the value of the investment expost.11
7
Several other justifications are commonly given for mandatory, sys-
tematized disclosure. First, the 1933 and 1934 Acts embody the view that
the issuer is ultimately in the best position to disclose information about it-
1 3 See discussion supra Parts I.A.-I.C.
114 Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. Rav. 649, 649 (1995)
[hereinafter Seligman, Obsolescence].
15 See Seligman, Disclosure System, supra note 64, at 28-30.
1 6 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protec-
tion of Investors, 70 VA. L. Rv. 669, 677 (1984).
17 See Seligman, Disclosure System, supra note 64, at 53. In fact, the risk of this is
probably greater than 50% because (the investor reasons) if the information added value to
the investment and improved the prospects of the issuer, why would the issuer squelch it?
Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116, at 683 ("If the firm simply asked for money
without disclosing the project and managers involved,... it would get nothing. Investors
would assume the worst, because, they would reason that if the firm had anything good to
say for itself it would do so."). But cases can be imagined where beneficial insider informa-
tion is useful to management in the short term. Alternatively, some information may be held
back because a substantial long-term benefit depends on its present nondisclosure. See, e.g.,
Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (finding that misleading statements by company
management in respect of confidential merger discussions were only potentially significant
to plaintiffs' investment decision due to the high probability that such discussions would
collapse).
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self at the least cost both to itself and potential investors.1 8 Second, a uni-
form duty of disclosure solves a persistent collective action problem in
which firms acting individually would hesitate to disclose information use-
ful to their competitors unless such competitors were also disclosing the
same type of information.119 Third, because a mandatory disclosure regime
lowers overall investment costs, it increases the liquidity of securities.
120
This last factor not only increases the profitability of market participants
such as stock exchanges and brokers, but also assures investors the ability
to sell their securities at a moment's notice, and hence greatly diminishes
the risk of "going down with the ship." Finally, a systematized form of dis-
closure enables the comparison of many firms on the basis of related cate-
gories of information. 12  In addition to reducing the cost of making such
disclosures, this standardized format lowers enforcement costs, both ad-
ministrative, prior to registration, and judicial, during litigation.
Beyond these largely "in hindsight" rationalizations, it is clear that one
of the principal motivating forces behind the final shape of the 1933 Act
was the protection of the small, individual investors' 22 rather than sophisti-
cated investors who could "fend for themselves. 123 As professed by FCSM
Chairman Vasilyev, the same concern for the proverbial "widows and or-
phans" is at the center of his Commission's efforts to impose and enforce
rigorous disclosure rules on Russian firms. 24 It is useful to recall, however,
that while U.S. disclosure rules have succeeded in attracting an increasing
number of individual investors since the 1930s, 125 modem theories on the
structure of securities markets question the capacity of individual investors
to benefit from the disclosed information and the utility of preferring man-
118This is related to the above argument that the issuer has an incentive to minimize a
potential investor's cost of searching out information. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 116, at 685.
"91d. at 685-86.
'20 d. at 689-90.
121Id. at 700-01.
'22See Seligman, Obsolescence, supra note 114, at 659 & n.55 (citing for the same
proposition James Landis, one of the drafters of the Securities Act of 1933).
"2See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
124 See July 5 Press Conference, supra note 62:
The concept that was approved by the President orients us at the creation of a powerful
Russian national market of securities. A big accent is being made on the social compo-
nent, on the social orientation of the development of this market in the interests of small
investors, in the interests of citizens.
See also March 5 Press Conference, supra note 61:
Of all the laws I would single out one on which progress has been very unsatisfactory.
This is the law on protection of the rights of citizens in the securities market .... The
law is of pivotal importance in the light of the current political events because it gives
precedence to the rights of the investor. The individual is always right, and the Com-
mission, the professional participants in the market, or the issuer are wrong.
'25See Seligman, Obsolescence, supra note 114, at 660.
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datory disclosure to the investigatory and monitoring function performed by
professional market participants.126 Most recently, the SEC's historic in-
sistence on the admittedly burdensome disclosure requirements of the 1933
Act has yielded to a recognition that the efficient market hypothesis, 127 the
advent of foreign capital markets as viable alternatives to the domestic mar-
ket, and the growing influence of institutional investors no longer support to
the same extent the traditionally predominant concern with the individual
investor.
128
It is abundantly clear from the discussion above that Russia today lacks
the kind of efficient market in which abundant information is instantly
parsed by professional market participants and reflected in stock prices.
However, this deficiency does not necessarily justify the conclusion that in
the absence of an efficient market, the FCSM should rush to protect indi-
vidual investors through a regulatory regime evocative of the 1933 Act.
1 30
12sAs Easterbrook & Fischel argue, "[n]o matter what the disclosure laws say, the 'aver-
age investor' who gets disclosure statements through the mail will always be too late to take
advantage of any bargains available to those who use information first." See supra note 116,
at 694.
127See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). Market "efficiency" is based on the notion that market prices
generally reflect available information and that such prices rapidly adjust to new informa-
tion, diminishing the potential for opportunistic trades (except in the very short term). Id. at
552.
128 See Seligman, Obsolescence, supra note 114, at 682-83.
1
2 9 See discussion supra Part I.A. For confirmation that even the largest Russian compa-
nies disclose material information to select investment companies and insiders up to one
week before making general disclosure to the markets, see Gregory L. White, Lukoil's Unof-
ficial Release of Earnings Highlights Bugs in the Russian Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20,
1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 11810430. Although the problem is arguably the re-
sult of inefficiency rather than deliberate action, it is plainly endemic.
'3"The fact that the FCSM has in fact borrowed extensively from U.S. law is not sur-
prising. A Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. SEC and the FCSM, signed on
December 5 and 6, 1995 by, respectively, Chairman Levitt of the SEC and Chairman Chu-
bais of the FCSM, provides for extensive cooperation between the two regulatory organiza-
tions. Item 5 of the Memorandum is telling:
The [SEC and FCSM] anticipate that, subject to the availability of resources, specific as-
sistance may be provided in the following manner:
(a) Assistance by the SEC staff in drafting laws and regulations governing the securities
markets, which will include consideration of and reference to the corresponding U.S.
securities laws and regulations;
(b) Advisory missions by the SEC staff and other relevant U.S. experts to Russia to
conduct intensive training in specific subject areas;
(c) Conducting seminars in the United States and/or Russia concerning securities regu-
lation;
(d) Internship programs for the [FCSM] personnel at the SEC and for Russian securities
market professionals with U.S. financial services providers.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Federal Commission on Securities and the Capital Market of the Gov-
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Other approaches to securities regulation may be much more apt when a
tradition of secretive extra-legal transactions, poor enforcement of existing
laws, managerial wrongdoing, and oligopolistic industrial groups threaten
the development of a market in securities based on ease of entry.131 A dis-
cussion of the merits of such approaches will follow the overview of the
disclosure provisions in the 1996 Securities Law.
B. Disclosure Russian-style
1. Disclosure Provisions
The 1996 Securities Law envisions the disclosure of information to
potential investors in three contexts: (i) a public offering of securities;
13 2
(ii) a quarterly report on the securities; and (iii) the occurrence of "es-
sential events and acts bearing on the issuer's economic and financial activ-
ity" of such securities. 34  All issues of securities are subject to
registration. 135 A public issue, defined as (i) the distribution of securities to
an unlimited number of investors, (ii) the distribution of securities to more
than 500 known investors, or (iii) having an aggregate value of more than
50,000 minimum wages (approximately U.S. $750,000 in mid-1996), also
requires the registration of a prospectus. 36 Unlike the 1933 Act, the 1996
Securities Law does not command the distribution of a prospectus to poten-
ernment of the Russian Federation Regarding Technical Cooperation, Mutual Assistance
and Consultation, WORLD SEC. L. REP., Jan. 1996, at 26-27.
131 Professor Black noted that if the 1934 Act had been drafted before the 1933 Act, it
would have obviated the need for the 1933 Act. Clearly, if companies were ordered to pro-
duce periodic disclosure, there would be no need for disclosure at the point of issuance. The
SEC responded to the duplicative disclosure requirements in the 1933 and 1934 Acts by
adopting its integrated disclosure system. See Securities Act Release No. 6235 (Sept. 2,
1980), 20 SEC Dock. 1175; Securities Act Release No. 6383 (Mar. 3, 1982), 24 SEC Dock.
1262. The larger issue is why Russia made the same mistake 60 years later. A likely expla-
nation is that the FCSM would have been ignored were it to attempt to regulate companies
directly; as a result, the adoption of the dual disclosure tracks was a calculated decision
rather than mere imitation. See Telephone Interview with Bernard Black, Professor of Law
at Columbia University School of Law (Apr. 17, 1997).
1321996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 23.
1331d. art. 30.
134 1Id. Article 23 of the 1996 Securities Law contains a further requirement to report in-
formation concerning material facts bearing on the financial and economic activities of the
issuer. Such facts, events, and activities must be reported to the registering agency within
five working days of their occurrence. Id. art. 23.
13Id. art. 19.
136Id. This quantitative rule resembles the requirements of Rule 502(b) of the 1933 Act,
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b), in which the quantity and detail of the information to be provided
outside of a Section 5 public offering is a function of the aggregate value of the offering.
The 1933 Act contains a more graduated spectrum of disclosure requirements than does the
Russian Securities Law.
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tial investors but seeks to ensure that all investors can obtain access to the
information disclosed in the prospectus.13 7 In addition, the 1996 Securities
Law requires the registration of an account of the final result of the issue
(otchet ob itogakh vypuska).
In view of the scope of disclosure envisioned by the prospectus re-
quirements, the 1996 Securities Law provides abundant opportunities for
potentially actionable misrepresentations. The 1996 Securities Law com-
bines disclosure requirements comparable to those contained in the 1933
Act on the public placement of securities 139 and in the 1934 Act on the in-
formation to be disclosed during secondary trading of securities. 140  Ini-
tially, the 1996 Securities Law provisions relating to the post-distribution
and secondary trading phase appeared to be more comprehensive than its
regulations on registration and prospectus requirements. With the adoption
of Decree No. 19,Mg' however, the regulations on the publication of the pro-
spectus142 and financial statements"' have been vastly expanded, so that
they increasingly resemble comparable U.S. regulations under the 1933
Act.14
The prospectus guidelines in Decree No. 19 list more than fifty items
that serve as guidelines for disclosure, ranging from broad categories to
terse phrases that must be included verbatim on the title page of the pro-
137Id. art. 23. The issuer must publish information about the procedure of accessing the
information in a periodical with a circulation of at least 50,000 copies. Id.
3'Id. arts. 19, 25. The account of the results of an issue must be submitted to the regis-
tering agency within 30 days following the conclusion of the distribution. Id. art. 25.
139 See 1996 Securities Law, supra note 1, arts. 19-27.
14°See id. art. 30.
141FCSM Decree No. 19 "Ob Utverzhdenii Standartov Emisii Aktsyj pri Uchrezhdenii
Aktsionernykh Obcshestv, Dopolnitel'nykh Aktsyj, Obligatsyj i ikh Prospektov Emisii" [On
Standards of Issue of Shares at Foundation of Joint-Stock Companies, of Additional Shares,
Bonds and Prospectuses of Issue Thereof.], Sep. 17, 1996, translation available in Westlaw,
RUSLINE Database, 1996 WL 731776, amended by FCSM Decree No. 8 "Ob Utverzhdenii
Standarlov Emisii Aktsy i Obligatsyj i ikh Prospektov Emisii pri Reorganizatsii Kommer-
cheskikh Organizatsyj i Vnesenii Izmeneni v Standarty Emisii Aktsyj pri Uchrezhdenii
Aktsionernykh Obcshestv, Dopolnitel'nykh Aktsyj, Obligatsy i ikh Prospektov Emisii, Ut-
verzhdennye PostanovIeniem Federal'noy Komissii po Rynku Tsennykh Bumag ot 17/9/96
No. 19" [On Issue Standards for Shares and Bonds, and their Issue Prospectuses Subject to
the Reorganization of Commercial Organizations, and on the Amendments to the Standards
of Issue of Shares at Foundation of Joint-Stock Companies, of Additional Shares, Bonds and
Prospectuses of Issue Thereof., confirmed by FCSM Decree of Sept. 17, 1996], Feb. 12,
1997, translation available in Westlaw, RUSLINE Database, 1997 WL 268619 [hereinafter
Decree No. 19].
'42Id., Addendum 3.
'43 Id., Addendum 4.
144Cf Regulation S-K under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 229.
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spectus. 145 Beyond detailed data on the issuer's managers and directors,
146
the 1996 Securities Law requires disclosure of information with respect to
"participants" in the issuer, 47 its membership in any "industrial, banking,
and financial groups, holdings, concerns, and associations," and its function
in such organizations, 148 extensive information with respect to the issuer's
primary activities, 149 and comprehensive financial statements for the past
three years.'50
One disclosure item that may prove extremely subjective without clari-
fication and some kind of safe harbor against incorrect predictions relates to
"soft" information, including plans of future activities, sources of income,
new forms of production, and the expansion or contraction of current pro-
duction areas.' Finally, in addition to the express disclosure provisions
listed in the 1996 Securities Law and Decree No. 19, the issuer is instructed
to provide "other [material] information which may affect a decision to pur-
chase the issuer's securities
' ' 52 as well as an analysis of risk factors.
153
145For example, Decree No. 19, supra note 141, Addendum 3, Item 6 requires the inclu-
sion of the phrase "The registering agency is not responsible for the veracity of the informa-
tion contained in this prospectus, and its registration of such prospectus is not an indication
of such agency's opinion as to the issued securities." The phrase must be printed in the larg-
est of the typefaces used to print other text on the title page of the prospectus. Cf. Regulation
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.501o(b)(5): see infra note 165.
146Such data must include, for example, the issuer's managerial structure, information
about members of its board of directors and officers (as well as all posts held by such direc-
tors and officers during the past five years and their holdings in the issuer, if any), as well as
the compensation of such officers and directors. See Decree No. 19, supra note 141, Adden-
dum 3, Items 19-22.
1471996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 22. Participants [Uchasinila] are defined as
holders of five percent or more of the issuer's equity, as well as the entities in which the is-
suer holds an equity stake larger than five percent. See Decree No. 19, supra note 141, Ad-
dendum 3, Item 17. Decree No. 19 in turn qualifies this provision by requiring disclosure of
the identity, address, and size of stake of any such participants, as well as information on the
holders of a 25% or greater stake in the equity or voting stock of such affiliate. See also
Items 23, 24, and 26, id. Cf. § 14(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(1), which imposes a similar disclosure duty under § 13(d) of the Act on persons who,
as a result of a tender offer, directly or indirectly, would become beneficial owners of more
than five percent of a class of shares registered under § 12 of the Act.
148Decree No. 19, supra note 141, Addendum 3, Item 27.
149The level of detail required is somewhat ameliorated by the statement that such disclo-
sure need not compel the release of information that might adversely affect the issuer's abil-
ity to compete. See id., Addendum 3, Item 28.
'50See id., Addendum 3, Items 32-36. Additionally, financial statements for the issuer's
last fiscal year require an auditor's opinion and balance sheet data for the last quarter pre-
ceding the decision to issue securities. See id. Items 32-36.
151 See id., Addendum 3, Item 28.
152 See id., Addendum 3, Item 31.
153 Risk factors are to be grouped under economic, social, technological, and ecological
categories. Id., Addendum 3, Item 49.
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As shown above, the FCSM has adopted a disclosure system that re-
quires an issuer to release copious amounts of information about itself, its
related organizations, its managerial and directorial staffs, and its financial
situation.114 Despite the amount of information sought, many of the disclo-
sure provisions of the 1996 Securities Act and related FCSM directives are
broad and open-ended enough to be burdensome without necessarily lead-
ing to disclosure of facts meaningful to the average investor. The magni-
tude of the burden on Russian companies to comply with such securities
legislation is roughly comparable to the burden on the FCSM and the Rus-
sian judiciary system to enforce such provisions. It is unclear whether liti-
gation under as-yet unenacted federal legislation allowing for private rights
of action under the 1996 Securities Law will give meaning to the disclosure
provisions similar to the way in which private suits have done so in the
United States. If individual and many sophisticated investors choose to stay
away from the courts, as they mainly do today,155 it is difficult to imagine
how the FCSM alone will be able to police and give meaning to its own
regulations.
2. Enforcement
Upon receiving all the necessary registration materials and prospectus
from the issuer, the registering agency must register the issue within
thirty days, or make a "reasoned decision on the denial of registration.
15-7
The registering agency may deny registration on several grounds, among
them the presence of false or "untruthful" information (information not in
accordance with reality) in the prospectus or in the decision to issue securi-
ties. 58 A particularly troubling provision of the 1996 Securities Law enti-
154Disclosure provisions and prospectus requirements applicable upon the issue or con-
version of debt or equity following a reorganization, merger, or consolidation of joint-stock
companies are covered separately in FCSM Decree No. 8, see supra note 141.
155 One notable exception is the recent victory of a group of foreign and domestic inves-
tors in securing representation on the board of the Novolipetsk Metal Company. The group,
which owned a combined stake of 40% in the company and sought commensurate represen-
tation on the board of directors, won the right to nominate its representatives before a lower
Arbitrazh court. The case - actually a combination of three actions - was seen as a crucial
test of the ability of outside shareholders to influence the governing process of Russian com-
panies. See John Thomhill, Russian Court Backs Investors: Victory for Shareholders' Rights
in Dispute with NLMK, Fmn. TIMES, May 22, 1997, at 2.
156 The registering organ would presumably be the FCSM or one of its regional branches.
However, the FCSM may delegate this function to other bodies. Prior to the passage of the
1996 Securities Law, this function was exercised by the Ministry of Finance. See Peter J.
Pettibone, Russia's New Law on the Securities Market, WORLD SEC. L. REP., July 1996, at
30,31.
1571996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 20; Decree No. 19, supra note 141, art. 55.
1581996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 21. Other grounds for denial include: (i) the
issuer's breach of the requirements of Russian Federation ("RF") legislation on securities,
including filed information "warranting the conclusion that the terms and conditions of the
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ties the registering agency to halt or invalidate an issue and rescind the pro-
ceeds to the purchasers if the issuer (i) violates Russian law in the course of
an issuance, or (ii) provides untruthful information in the documents on the
basis of which the securities were registered. 59 The provision enacts a dra-
conian penalty for misstatements which ostensibly need not be material and
which are not subject to any statute of limitations.
160
issue and trading of issued securities contradict RF legislation, and concerning a discrepancy
between the terms and conditions of the securities issue and RF legislation on securities; and
(ii) a discrepancy between the filed documents and the information they contain, and re-
quirements of the present Federal Act." Id.
Decree No. 19 underscores the drafting inconsistencies in Russian securities legislation
and the difficulties foreseeable in the ultimate interpretation of such legislation. Article 59
of the Decree lists the exclusive reasons for a denial of registration of a securities issue as
follows:
(a) A discrepancy between the submitted [registration] documents and the requirements
of legislation, legal enactments, the present Standards, and other enactments of the Fed-
eral Commission;
(b) The presence in the submitted documents of facts warranting the conclusion that the
issuer has violated the terms of legislation, legal acts, the present Standards, and other
acts of the Federal Commission (including their possible violation as a consequence of
the distribution of securities);
(c) The failure to pay in full taxes on securities transactions, as stated in legislation;
(d) The presence in the submitted documents of deliberately false information, as well
as statements prone to mislead [sposobnykh vvesti v zabluzhdenie].
Decree No. 19, supra note 141, art. 59.
Because the language used in the decree is substantially different from the language used
in Article 20 of the 1996 Securities Law, it is unclear whether and to what extent Decree No.
19 serves to amend, expand, or nullify the 1996 Securities Law provision, or whether it can
be seen to contradict the earlier Law. In the latter case, the provisions of the Decree and the
Law require essential interpretation and reconciliation.
1591996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 26. It is unclear whether an omission - rather
than an untruthful statement - would qualify as a violation of the 1996 Securities Law dis-
closure provisions. The "statements prone to mislead" language in Decree No. 19, art. 59(d)
might be viewed as reaching omissions, but need official interpretation. The Decree sug-
gests further that the registering agency might be held accountable for omissions [polnotu
svedenj] in the prospectus. See infra text accompanying note 166. An equally significant
problem is that Article 59 does not mention materiality as a threshold for the denial of regis-
tration.
'6°See Pettibone, supra note 156, at 31. One possible mollifying interpretation of Article
26 would view its language in the context of a similar provision in Presidential Decree No.
1233, 0 Zaschite Interesov Investorov [On the Protection of Investors' Interests], art. 9, June
11, 1994, which gave the registering agency a similar power for "deliberately [zavedomo]
false" information. Because Article 26 is entitled "Bad Faith [Nedobrosovestnaya] Issu-
ance," it is possible that scienter will be required before nullification and rescission are de-
clared. See James Christiansen, New Russian Securities Law Bolsters Regulator's Powers,
INT'L FIN. L. Rnv., Aug. 1996, at 29, 30 (1996). Article 59(d) of Decree No. 19 also refers
to deliberately [zavedomo] false facts as grounds for denial of registration, see supra note
158.
As one critic of the 1996 Securities Law summed up, Article 26 taken literally hangs a
permanent "sword of Damocles" over every issue. See Christiansen, supra. However, a de-
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Once an issue is registered (the "post-effective" period), the issuer has
up to one year to complete the distribution of the securities. ' During such
time, the registering agency may demand that the issuer make corrections to
untruthful information contained in the prospectus only when such a mis-
statement is not of material significance or is a technical error.1 62 The is-
suer also has a duty to correct disclosure when any subsequent facts or
events may affect an investor's decision to purchase securities. 163 However,
the decision to issue securities and the issue prospectus itself may not be
amended during the post-effective period; such documents may only be
amended with respect to the terms and conditions of the distribution of se-
curities, and then exclusively if necessary to safeguard the interests of the
actual or potential owners of such securities.164 The resulting rigidity is a
strong incentive to get the disclosure right the first time, or face the possi-
bility of issue nullification under Article 26 of the 1996 Securities Law.
6S
Oddly, the enforcement of some disclosure regulations imposes a sig-
nificant onus on the FCSM (or any other registering agency that has the re-
sponsibility for registering a given issue) beyond anything that the SEC
must endure. According to Article 54 of Decree No. 19, the registering
agency bears responsibility for the adequacy of the information contained in
the issue prospectus, but not for its truthfulness. 66 How broadly this state-
cision to nullify an issue is discretionary and may be replaced by a decision to halt the distri-
bution of securities until the misrepresentations are corrected. Moreover, Article 51(3) of
the 1996 Securities Law declares that the process of issue nullification under Article 26 must
begin with an action filed by the FCSM with a court if the bad faith issue "resulted in a ma-
terially significant delusion of the owners [of the securities involved], or if the purposes of
the issue are contrary to the principles of law and order and morality." See infra text accom-
panying note 203. Thus it seems that a decision on issue nullification is ultimately a judicial,
rather than an administrative one.
161 1996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 24. For further discussion of this provision,
see text accompanying notes 206-09.
162Decree No. 19, supra note 141, art. 65.
1631d.
164 id.
165The Russian Criminal Code, UK RF § 185 (1997), reinforces this incentive by order-
ing fines and imprisonment for persons introducing deliberately unreliable [zavedomo
nedostovernojl information into an issue prospectus, confirming a prospectus containing
such information, or confirming a deliberately unreliable account of the result of an issue.
To trigger such penalties, an offense must have caused a "material loss" [krupnyj ushcherb].
Russian Criminal Code, UK RF § 185 (1997).
'66Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1994), which states, in part:
Neither the fact that the registration statement for a security has been filed or is in effect
nor the fact that a stop order is not in effect with respect thereto shall be deemed a
finding by the Commission that the registration statement is true and accurate on its
face or that it does not contain an untrue statement of fact or omit to state a material
fact, or be held to mean that the commission has in any way passed upon the merits of,
or given approval to, such security.
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ment is interpreted will determine the extent to which the registering agency
will share liability with an issuer for an omission that may even, in theory,
be inadvertent.
The enforcement obligations of the FCSM thus clearly approach, and
at times surpass, comparable duties of the SEC.167 In addition to the review
of registration documents, the duties of the FCSM include, but are not lim-
ited to: i) policing the disclosure made by any owner of the issuer's securi-
ties when such owner's stake exceeds twenty percent or more of such
securities and when such owner's stake increases or decreases by five per-
cent while remaining above the twenty percent threshold; 168 ii) preventing
insider trading;169 iii) stopping gun-jumping and market conditioning
through false, inaccurate, or anticompetitive media advertisements; 170 and
iv) licensing professional market participants. 71 Although the primary fo-
cus of this article is on disclosure rules and their enforcement by the FCSM,
the extent of the FCSM's other duties are indicative of the formidable task
it faces in establishing a securities market adequately safe for the individual
Russian investor. In view of the challenges reviewed in Parts I.A-I.C, this
article proceeds to question whether a more minimalist approach to securi-
ties regulation may be a better alternative for the immediate future.
lI. TOWARD A SELF-ENFORCING MODEL OF SECURITIES REGULATION
A. The Problem
In many countries, and especially in the United States, the boundary
between corporate and securities law is often vaguely defined; sometimes it
vanishes entirely as corporate and securities law provisions complement
each other. Proxy rules governing the solicitation of shareholder votes un-
der the Delaware General Corporation Law,172 for example, are also the
(Emphasis added); in Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.501(b)(5), the required legend on the
outside front cover page of a prospectus provides, "THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT
BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COMMISSION PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR
ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS."
167 For instance, one particularly harsh provision, surpassing even the possibility of nulli-
fication under Article 26 of the 1996 Securities Law, is Article 5-19 of Presidential Decree
No. 1009, 0 Federal'noj Komissil Po Rynku Tsennykh Bumag ["On the Federal Commission
for the Securities Markets"], July 1, 1996. It gives the FCSM the right to petition the Arbi-
trazh courts for the liquidation of an entity that breaches the requirements of Russian federal
legislation on securities.




172See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (1995).
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subject of § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, which prohibits the solicitation of, or
permission of, the use of any person's name to solicit "any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security... registered pursuant to section
12" of such Act in contravention of applicable SEC rules and regulations.
73
Likewise, many provisions of the Joint-Stock Company Law reference the
1996 Securities Law 74 or may be designated securities laws themselves. 75
Consequently, when two laws regulate the same basic terrain - the
ability of firms and other legal entities to raise capital - one would expect
such laws to have at their base a comparable regulatory and enforcement
model, concordant with the legal culture and economic considerations in-
digenous to the place of enactment. The 1996 Securities Law and related
FCSM regulations decidedly are constructed on the principles of a Western
regulatory system' 76 which stresses a high level of disclosure, enforcement,
and policing by courts, administrative bodies, self-regulatory entities such
as stock exchanges, and private investors. By contrast, the Joint-Stock
17315 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994).
174Because the 1996 Securities Law had not been enacted when the Joint-Stock Com-
pany Law came into effect, the references are made to "legal acts of the Russian Federation
on securities." One example of the overlap between the two laws is found in the Joint-Stock
Company Law provision on "Bonds and Other Securities" in Article 33, and in Article 17 of
Decree No. 19 (Reference to Article 17 is to the Russian version of Decree No. 19; Article
17 is Article 19 in the Westlaw version.).
Article 33(2) of the Joint-Stock Company Law states that "bonds and other securities
shall be placed by a company by decision of the board of directors (supervisory council) of
the company, unless otherwise provided for by the company charter." Joint-Stock Company
Law, supra note 5. Likewise, Article 17 of Decree No. 19 provides that "a decision as to the
issuance of shares or bonds shall be ratified by the board of directors of such joint-stock
company ([or] the organ which executes the duties of a board of directors in accordance with
the laws and other legal acts of the Russian Federation)." Decree No. 19, supra note 141.
175 See, for example, the anti-dilution provision of the Joint-Stock Company Law, supra
note 141, Article 33, Item 4, which prohibits the placement of bonds and other securities
convertible into company stock if the number of a company's outstanding shares of various
classes is less than the number of shares of the same classes which such bonds and securities
give the right to buy.
1761 hesitate to suggest that a "Western" regulatory framework has influenced the 1996
Securities Law, supra note 1, in part because there is no uniform approach to securities
regulation among developed nations. For instance, while U.S. disclosure provisions are me-
ticulously set forth in Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1997), England and Canada have
shied away from specific disclosure guidelines; both countries favor general instructions
(e.g., describe the issuer's business) without providing further guidance as to the specific
facts that may be material to an understanding of the issuer's business. See Facilitation of
Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6568, 32 SEC Docket
(CCH) 707, 710 (Feb. 28, 1985). On the other hand, 1994 saw the enactment of Germany's
Securities Trading Act, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, BGB1. 1 1994, 1749 [hereinafter German
Securities Act], which increases the level of issuer disclosure to levels comparable with the
1996 Securities Law. See Hartmut Krause, The German Securities Trading Act (1994): A
Ban on Insider Trading and an Issuer's Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Nonpublic
Information, 30 INT'L LAW 555 (1996).
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Company Law is grounded in a self-enforcing approach to corporate law
promoted by Professors Black and Kraakman in their recent article.177 The
self-enforcing model may be seen as a best-approach-under-the-
circumstances, when the "circumstances" involve the lack of some or all of
the institutions commonly found in developed market economies. These
include:
a competitive product market, a reasonably efficient capital market, an
active market for corporate control, incentive compensation for manag-
ers, and at least occasional oversight by large outside shareholders...
Sophisticated professional accountants, elaborate financial disclosure,
an active financial press, and strict antifraud provisions .. .Sophisti-
cated courts ... administrative agencies ... and self-regulatory organi-
zations.
178
Paradoxically, Black and Kraakman note, emerging economies need
the protections of well-defined rules of corporate behavior precisely when
institutions and resources capable of policing such behavior are either de-
fective or missing.179 Moreover, their absence does not imply that a vac-
uum exists in their place. On the contrary, various other entities step into
the void: FIGs and domestic commercial banks as corporate monitors; °80
extralegal dispute arbitration occasionally employing violent enforcement
methods;"' and government officials eager to peddle their influence.
82
Faced with a similar lack of effective institutions, the United States and
England developed a body of corporate law within what Black and Kraak-
man term a "prohibitive model."' 3 Over time, prohibitive codes, which
barred outright certain types of corporate conduct most open to abuse, were
replaced with "enabling codes" that fashioned default rules, leaving specific
instances of abuse to by-now developed institutions.8 a In selecting among
various principles of corporate law for Russia, Black and Kraakman found
that whereas the enabling model would provide little if any guidance to
177See Black & Kraakman, supra note 13.
178Id. at 1920-21. The prospects for an independent financial press have been clouded
by the recent interest of large banks and industrial groups in Russian news media. Once ac-
quired, periodicals have served their largest shareholders as vehicles for self-promotion. See
Mark Whitehouse, The Money Behind the News, Moscow TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1997, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
1
79See Black & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 1921.
1
8OSee supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
'8 1 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 75 (describing the assassination of Paul Tatem, an
American businessman who became involved in a prolonged dispute over ownership rights
in a Moscow hotel complex).
1
82 See Remnick, supra note 19, at 36 ("[B]ribery greases the wheels of commerce. Gov-
ernment officials, who issue licenses and permissions of all sorts, 'practically have a price
list hanging on the office wall.").
183 Black & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 1930.
'1Id. at 1974.
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Russian courts, investors, and managers, the prohibitive model was only
slightly superior. The enabling model was inappropriate due to the vague-
ness of its rules and its emphasis on flexibility more suitable to a universe
where market participants operated within a fairly well-defined and ac-
knowledged set of enforceable legal and professional boundaries. The pro-
hibitive model failed by virtue of its rigidity, the ease with which it may be
avoided over time, and its heavy reliance on judicial or administrative en-
forcement.s
It is possible to see the U.S. - and by extension, the Russian - secu-
rities regulatory regimes as "prohibitive" in many ways. Numerous provi-
sions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, as well as the 1996 Securities Law,
specifically forbid certain types of conduct with respect to the sale, pur-
chase, promotion, advertisement, or solicitation of securities. 16 Both re-
gimes impose highly intrusive and detailed disclosure rules on securities
issuers, 18and both employ punitive sanctions against violators of such
rules and legislation.188 Yet, the rigid, intrusive, and enforcement-intensive
character of this regulatory model is, if anything, self-defeating in the Rus-
sian context for the same reason that a prohibitive corporate law would be.
By the same token, simple fraud laws are even less likely to halt securities
abuses in Russia than they were in the United States prior to 1933, and
meager institutional support exists for default rules of operation such as the
Delaware General Corporation Law.
The gist of the third alternative - the self-enforcing model - in the
corporate law context is the creation of a system of "mandatory procedural
and structural rules [that] empower outside directors and large minority
shareholders to protect themselves against opportunism by insiders" while
minimizing overall reliance on judicial and administrative enforcement.
189
'Id. at 1931.
186For example, both the U.S. and Russian regimes restrict certain types of advertise-
ments prior to the registration effective date: 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.134,
and 1996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 36; both regimes restrict offers to sell and offers
to buy prior to the filing of the registration documents with the registering agency: 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e(c) and Decree No. 19, supra note 141, art. 36; and both regimes limit transactions with
securities during the waiting period to agreements between the issuer and its underwriter
syndicate, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(c), 77b(2)(3) and Decree No. 19, supra note 141, art. 36.
187See Securities Act of 1933, Regulation S-K; Decree No. 19, supra note 141, Adden-
dum 3 (1996); and Decree No. 8, supra note 141, Addendum 3 (1997). In addition, both the
U.S. and Russian laws require periodic disclosure filings with their respective securities
commissions.
188 in the U.S. context, compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q (Fraudulent, Interstate Transactions),
77x (Penalties), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1) (Injunctions), 78u-3 (Cease-and-Desist Proceed-
ings), and 78ff (Penalties), with (in the Russian context) the 1996 Securities Law, supra note
1, art. 51 (1996) (Liability for Breach of RF Legislation on Securities) and Russian Criminal
code, UK RF, see note 165, § 185 (1997).
'
89See Black & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 1932.
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The chief emphasis of this model is on structural constraints (such as share-
holder voting requirements triggered by specific corporate actions), simple,
bright-line rules, and strong remedies against violations. 190
Even so, the term "self-enforcing," as used throughout this discussion
should be invoked as a strictly nominal reference to the Black and Kraak-
man model. It would be a mistake to assume that the structure I propose is
literally self-enforcing. To emphasize clear rules, reputational constraints,
and substitute structures that facilitate the enforcement of the Russian secu-
rities laws is not to claim that such laws are enforceable in and of them-
selves. The emphasis of the Black and Kraakman model is rather on the
substitution of alternative means of enforcement for the traditional institu-
tions that are either missing or inadequate. Thus, it is only in this narrow
sense that the rubric "self-enforcement" is used herein.
The aim now is to see whether the enabling model applied in the Rus-
sian corporate context can be transplanted successfully to its securities
regulatory framework.
B. The Relevance of the Self-Enforcing Model
Assuming for the moment that securities regulation can ever be made
self-enforcing, one might question the utility of the entire project. It is true
that while the success of the U.S. regulatory model has created a strong se-
curities market in the United States, such a model has been traditionally
much less relevant in Japan under bureaucratic guidance that favored bank
financing over equity.191 However, one argument would posit that the most
effective structure of securities regulation largely depends on the legal cul-
ture and economic circumstances of the adopting state. With that in mind,
evidence from several developing, post-Communist East European econo-
mies has indicated that a prohibitive, enforcement-intensive model inspires
greater investor confidence and creates more vibrant markets and diffuse
equity ownership than any alternative system.
The Czech Republic provides a remarkable parallel to the Russian ex-
perience. In 1991, the Czech government initiated a nationwide voucher
privatization program very similar to Russia's program of 1994, leaving the
enactment of concrete rules on investor protection and securities fraud for
the time when the- new owners would take control of the enterprises.'
92
'9°Id. at 1933-36.
191See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 230-232. But see Curtis J. Milhaupt, A
Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of
Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3, 49 (1996) (arguing that as a result of accelerating deregulation
the dominance of Japanese bank financing began to wane in the mid-70s, and that by 1989
issues of equities and related instruments accounted for more than 70% of the sources of
funds for Japanese manufacturing companies).
192 See John Reed, Trading Places: Cautious Poles Teach Laissez-Faire Czechs How to
Build a Bourse, WALL ST. J. EuR., Mar. 3, 1997, at 1.
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Subsequently, Czech fund-management groups began a series of takeovers,
aided by weak market transparency and the ability of large investors to pur-
chase substantial stakes without alerting other market participants or gov-
ernment regulators. The result was a consolidation of such holdings into a
relatively small number of very large industrial holding companies resem-
bling the Russian FIGs. 193 Faced with a large but highly illiquid market and
the prospect of takeovers, Czech companies opted for bank loans rather than
equity financing. 194 In comparison, tight regulation and enforcement of a
stringent "prohibitive" model of securities regulation, which forbid every-
thing not explicitly permitted, brought about a highly liquid and dynamic
securities market in Poland.195
While the Czech Republic is now attempting to recapture lost opportu-
nities by enacting a more rigorous securities code based on the principles of
disclosure and enforcement, the same ideal is not necessarily in Russia's
best interests. First, Russia is a much bigger country and has a far larger
economy than either Poland or the Czech Republic. Second, the impact
wrought by nearly seventy-five years of socialism on Russia's economy, le-
gal system, and mindset is more difficult to displace than the forty years
undergone by its satellite countries. Third, and most importantly, if Russia
has developed economically along the lines of the Czech Republic rather
than of Poland, it does not inevitably follow that a reflexive reversion to a
U.S.-style securities code will at once annul past mistakes and achieve mar-
ket transparency, all the while boosting investor confidence. The Russian
economy is not the tabula rasa that Poland was at the dawn of post-Soviet
reform and the Balcerowicz Plan.196 To create a strong securities market in
193 Id. Compare the experience of Russian FIGs, supra text accompanying notes 92-96
and note 106. According to one observer at the Prague Stock Exchange, the development of
the industrial groups was merely the realization of common expectations: "The going phi-
losophy was essentially Marxist: that the role of the stock market should be to bring about
the concentration of capital." Reed, supra note 192.
194 Id. Still more redolent of the Russian experience is the fact that the investment funds
involved in the takeovers were offshoots of Czech savings banks. As the more trusted insti-
tutions at the time, such banks were encouraged to set up the funds as a means of inspiring
confidence in the privatization process. See Gray, supra note 21:
A somewhat surprising development has been the concentrated ownership and
cross-ownership that has emerged from voucher privatization in the Czech Republic.
Not only is ownership concentrated in a few funds, but individual funds often own
shares of directly competing firms. Furthermore, the funds, together with affiliated
banks, are locked in an intricate web of cross-ownership (or sometimes self-ownership)
as a result of the privatization of the banks through vouchers. Thus banks are insulated
from competitive pressures, and the government continues to influence the economy
through its 40 percent (or greater) residual holdings of shares in privatized banks.
195See Reed, supra note 192.
196The Balcerowicz Plan, named after the Polish Finance Minister, was set in motion on
January 1, 1990, as one of the first post-Communist "shock therapy" economic plans. While
its concurrent attempts to cut inflation, end government subsidies and price controls, and
privatize state enterprises are credited with Poland's rapid economic transformation, other
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preference to the bank-dominated Japanese or German systems, Russia
must acknowledge and co-opt the institutions that already exist and have a
vested interest in the preservation of its current system, while pursuing
greater disclosure by tight-lipped firms and promoting the active participa-
tion of individual investors. One possible way to achieve this lies through a
self-enforcing model of securities law.
C. The Contours of a Self-Enforcing Securities Law
Perhaps sensing the difficulty of supporting and enforcing a prohibitive
securities regulation model, the Russian President issued a decree in July
1996, charting a general course for the future development of such regula-
tion.197 Most striking in juxtaposition to the highly prescriptive format of
the 1996 Securities Law is the decree's forthright acknowledgment of the
ascendance of self-regulation as the controlling principle of government
policy. The decree states:
The most important principles of government policy toward the securi-
ties market include: ... (c) the principle of minimal government inter-
ference and maximum self-regulation, which means that the
government regulates the activities of market actors only in cases where
it is absolutely necessary, and delegates a portion of its rulemaking and
controlling functions to the professional operators of the securities mar-
ket, organized as self-regulating organizations. Subject to the realiza-
tion of this principle, the government will act out of the necessity: (i) to
minimize federal budget expenditures on the creation of market infra-
structure; (ii) to decline the imposition of centralized decisions during
the creation of market infrastructure .... 198
One might argue that the decree does not necessarily imply a sudden
acceptance of self-enforcement and a rejection of the trend embodied in the
1996 Securities Law. The words of the decree, read as a kind of white pa-
per, do not have the effect of a law, nor is there any way of enforcing them
except through the normal course of legislation. The decree may also sug-
gest an emphasis on an English model, in which the London Stock Ex-
change plays a dominant regulatory role on the market. 99 However, a self-
enforcing approach may still be seen as consistent with the general idea of
the decree's principle, insofar as it seeks to "compensate for the weakness
of formal enforcement through a combination of relatively simple, bright-
factors also played a role. Significantly, Poles remained more sympathetic to market forces
than most other Soviet-bloc countries by, for example, never collectivizing their agricultural
sector. After the introduction of shock therapy, Poles actively solicited Western investment
and entry of Western firms. See Shlomo Maital, Poland Turns the Corner, BARRON'S, Apr.
12, 1993, at 10; The Downside ofDemocracy, EcoNoMisT, Dec. 15, 1990, at 46.
197See Presidential Decree No. 1008, supra note I 11.
19 8Id. § 2(2).
199See Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, supra note 176, at 710.
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line rules governing when its structural constraints apply, rules that insiders
will often comply with voluntarily, and strong sanctions for violating the
rules. , 2 °
1. Bright-Line Rules
In a sense, the 1996 Securities Law already manifests several traits that
render it self-enforcing. A side-by-side comparison of the 1996 Securities
Law with the 1933 Act finds that whereas the 1933 Act is perhaps more
compact and integrated in its overall structure, the 1996 Securities Law
does a better job of setting out easy to follow instructions in checklist
form. 201 In places, it also sets out simple, bright-line rules against conduct
uniformly condemned as improper, such as trading on inside information.20 2
Yet, in many other instances, the 1996 Securities Law provides little guid-
ance even for the most wary issuers. One particularly egregious specimen,
already mentioned,20 3 involves the potential nullification of an issue "where
[a] bad faith issue resulted in a materially significant delusion of the owners
[of the securities involved], or if the purposes of the issue are contrary to
the principles of law and order and morality."2°4 In another, the language of
the "exclusive" reasons for denial of registration in Article 59 of Decree
No. 19 varies considerably from the language of a comparable set of rea-
sons in Article 21 of the 1996 Securities Law.20 5
Some rules are questionable as a matter of policy. For instance, the
duty to correct disclosure arises when untruthful information contained in
the prospectus has no material significance, or is of a technical nature.
20 6
Several obvious question follow: why, if untruthful information is not mate-
rial, should the issuer be required to correct it?20 7 Or, if accurate disclosure
is a primary goal, why not state that any untruthful information that is inac-
2°°Black & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 1934-35.
201For example, Article 19 of the 1996 Securities Law lists four stages preceding the is-
sue of securities, then sets out a test for determining when an issue qualifies as a public
placement, and finally adds an additional four stages necessary for a proper public placement
(which include the preparation and registration of a prospectus, the disclosure of all infor-
mation contained in the prospectus, and the disclosure of all information contained in the re-
port on the results of the issue).
2021996 Securities Law, supra note 1, arts. 31-33.203 See supra text accompanying note 160.
204 1996 Securities Law, supra note 1, art. 51(3). Even if the definition of a "bad faith"
issue was free from ambiguity, there is nothing self-explanatory about a "materially signifi-
cant delusion" or "principles of law and order and morality."
205See supra text accompanying note 158.
206 See supra text accompanying note 162.
2°7As an alternative, the FCSM might order correction of a falsehood in the proximately
following quarterly report filed under Article 30 of the 1996 Securities Law.
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curate when made is subject to immediate compulsory correction?2 8 This
sweeping requirement would eliminate the need to define materiality, a
puzzle worthy of U.S. courts willing to split hairs in crafting a serviceable
denotation, but hardly conducive to clarity or certainty in the Russian con-
text. As much as possible, materiality should be clearly defined if it is to be
used at all. In the context of materially untruthful information, the trigger
might be the fall of the price of securities by a certain percentage (e.g.,
twenty percent) over the course of fifteen working days beginning with the
day on which the misrepresentation is discovered and divulged to the mar-
ket.
20 9
The goal of disclosure should not only be market transparency for its
own sake, but also to facilitate the participation of individual investors and
the entry of small firms into the capital markets. With respect to individual
investors, as contrasted with the sophisticated investors who are the main
actors on the Russian securities markets today, it is probably correct to say
that if some information is good, more is not necessarily better.210 While
self-enforcement is promoted through the prospectus schedule provided at
the end of Decree No. 19,211 smaller issuers or issuers placing securities of
comparatively small aggregate offering price should have the option of not
jumping through every single disclosure hoop applicable to issuers such as
Lukoil and Norilsk Nickel.212 While this raises the likely problem of inte-
gration, Part III.C.2 offers a structural solution based on the maintenance of
several trading systems.
A graduated approach to disclosure for smaller issuers ought not to
suggest that the release of information to the marketplace should be volun-
tary, only that it should be tailored to the size and objectives of the disclos-
ing firm. Evidence exists that once information about a firm is widely
available and regularly supplied to the investor community, the incentive
208The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit made this argument in Baclnan v. Polaroid
Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (1990), when it distinguished between a duty to correct seemingly any
statements which are inaccurate when made, and a different duty to correct prior statements
which have become materially misleading in light of subsequent events. Id. at 16-17 (em-
phasis added).
2"A further difficulty is the necessity of showing causation between such information
and the slip in price. Because many different contemporaneous factors contribute to fluctua-
tions in the price of a security, the link between the misrepresentation and the price fall may
be very weak, if at all determinable. The danger of a no-fault rule regarding misrepresented
information is that investors might take advantage of the rule by "sitting" on a discovered
misrepresentation until the issuer releases a lower-than-expected earnings report, and then
attribute the resulting price drop to the falsehood. One possible solution is to utilize a very
short statute of limitations (say, three months) during which investors may bring an action
citing misrepresentation.
210 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116, at 696.
2 11 See Decree No. 19, supra note 141, Addendum 3.212 Cf. Regulation D of the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R §§ 230.504-506, 230.502(b) (1997).
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for market participants to employ other procedural rules increases also, so
that little-used provisions of the 1996 Securities Law and the Joint-Stock
Company Law become increasingly relevant. The Red October tender offer
is one example. Having completed a Western-style initial public offering
("IPO") in December 1994,213 the company found itself at the center of the
first Western-style hostile tender offer bid ever staged in Russia. The
structure of the bid, orchestrated by Alliance-Menatep, the investment
banking arm of Menatep Bank, and advised on by Western experts, was
dictated by the high degree of transparency achieved by the IPO audit and
company disclosure. Because a traditional, behind-the-scenes takeover was
not possible, another approach was tried.214 The fact that the offer failed
due to a combination of management strong-arming of employees and a
poison pill215 does not diminish the larger point that high levels of disclo-
sure are in themselves a partial lever for jump-starting the Russian securi-
ties market.
The graduated approach also makes sense in the particular climate that
Russian firms face. Smaller firms, unlike companies already considered
blue chips, do not have sufficient exposure to enable them to access the in-
temational capital markets.216 If the immediate costs of intrusive disclosure
213 The results of the IPO were mixed. Both Russian institutional investors and foreign
investors bought up their allotments. Russian retail investors, however, purchased only
16,000 of the one million shares allotted for them, despite their combined savings. See Julie
Tolkacheva, Red October Share Offer: Not Sweet Enough?, Moscow TiMEs, Dec. 20, 1994,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File, cited in Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note
24, at 212 n.165. One theory advanced by Professor Brown as to why retail investors were
so disinterested in this IPO is that the sober projections in the Red October prospectus were
unexciting by comparison with the giddy promises made by MMM and similar fraudulent
enterprises. Yet it is also possible that with the MMM scandal already ended, Russian in-
vestors had become highly risk-averse even toward a company with superlative disclosure
and accurate figures.214According to Alliance-Menatep's CEO, Red October Stock was concentrated in the
hands of small shareholders and a few big shareholders, with only 30% of the shares freely
traded. See Natasha Mileusnic, No Trend After Menatep Hostile Bid, Moscow TIMEs, Aug.
1, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
215See Mary Brasier, Sweet Talks End Bid Dispute, DAMY TELEGRAPH, July 26, 1995, at
25; Mary Brasier, US Hunt for the Red October, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 22, 1995, at 1.
It is unclear what the result might have been if the tender offer had been staged after the
enactment of the Joint-Stock Company Law in 1995. Article 80 of this Law compels the
purchaser of 30% or more of a company's common stock to offer to buy out the remaining
shareholders at a price not lower than the average weight price of the stock over the six
months immediately preceding the date of the acquisition of the 30% or greater stake. In the
same vein, the Joint-Stock Company Law has curbed the ability to stage a quiet friendly
takeover, requiring a person who, alone or with his affiliates, intends to acquire 30% or more
of the common stock of a company, to send a written application to the company divulging
such intent no later than 30 days prior to such acquisition. See Joint-Stock Company Law,
supra note 5.216See supra text accompanying note 103.
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and registration are high, the only alternative options available to small
firms might be to turn to the banks and spread comparably higher overall
financing costs over a longer period of time, or else be denied investment
capital altogether. 217 Taking this into account, a self-enforcing model of se-
curities regulation might emphasize a voluntarily diminished disclosure
burden on smaller firms at the same time as it seeks the active participation
of individual investors. From the standpoint of the FCSM's limited re-
sources,21' diminished disclosure requirements for at least some Russian
firms will lower its burden of policing its own highly onerous and review-
intensive disclosure rules. While there may not be anything particularly
"self-enforcing" about this schema, its successful prevention of fraud and
encouragement of retail investor confidence are, I believe, attainable
through a set of self-enforcing structural constraints.
2. Structural Constraints
A reputation-based enforcement structure is at the core of the self-
enforcing model here described. As noted previously,2 19 effective judicial
enforcement of contract law (not to mention the 1996 Securities Law) is
perhaps years away in Russia, and the presence of a business culture that
stresses informal, extralegal relationships among market actors220 stymies
regulatory guidelines seeking to replace such behavior. The self-enforcing
alternative might respond with a regulatory system that places its emphasis
on building institutions to which market participants will adapt their trans-
actions rather than those which they will ignore - or worse, those which
over-regulate and throttle beneficial conduct.
a. Multiple Trading Systems
One such institution might be a product of already developing market
infrastructure. The National Association of Stock Market Participants
("NAUFUR") has installed a second trading system, RTS-2, as a counter-
part to the Russian Trading System ("RTS-I") already in place.221 The
217The prospect of this is not remote, given the banks' conservative lending patterns and
their reputation for risk aversion. See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 216-217.218 See supra text accompanying note 80.
219See supra Part II.B.2.
22°See, e.g., Thane Gustafson & Daniel Yergin, Miracle In Russia 2010?, Moscow
TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File ("[B]oth property
rights and financial stabilization are still highly fragile. Most of the protection for private
property is still 'extra-legal'; that is, it comes from protection by politicians and mafiosi.").
As Katharina Pistor notes, the sources of the semi-legality of market transactions include the
existing tax system and restrictive regulations, as well as clandestine profiteering on transac-
tion-related asset stripping and side payments. See Pistor, supra note 68, at 84.
221 See supra note 57; Sergei Tyagai, Equity Trading System Launched, EAST/WEST
COMMERSANT, Jan. 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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principle distinction between the two systems is that companies that trade
on RTS-2 need lower capitalization levels and must satisfy lower disclosure
requirements than their counterparts on RTS-1. 222 The system permits low-
liquidity securities to be quoted on an exchange, and, most importantly, al-
lows securities to move from RTS-2 to the more established RTS-1 once
they achieve a certain level of disclosure and liquidity, as well as move in
the opposite direction if disclosure and liquidity decline.22 3
Provided that it undergoes some regulatory improvements,2 4 RTS-2
promises to become a part of a reputational mechanism that gives investors
some idea of which companies offer informational transparency, which are
liquid, and which are not. The systems act as a kind of informal rating
agency. In promulgating rules for the trading systems, one beneficial fea-
ture would be the creation of an explicit connection between the level of
disclosure and trustworthiness of a company, and its listing on either RTS-1
or RTS-2. Instead of administrative action resulting in fines or issue nulli-
fication on the basis of "law and order" or morality principles, enforcement
of particularly egregious or recurrent misrepresentations or omissions in
disclosure may involve the transfer of a company's securities from a
"higher" trading system to a "lower" one.2 5 The goal would be, in part, to
attach a certain stigma to being listed on the lower-ranked system, and to
make investors aware of the reasons why a firm's securities trade on one
system rather than another.226 An explicit association of higher risk and
2nSee id.; Proskurina, supra note 24. RTS-2 has been successful in attracting companies
despite misgivings that many will not be actively traded. As of early March 1997, RTS-2
listed 74 securities in comparison with 89 for RTS-1. See RTS And RTS-2 Listing Revised,
NOVECON, Mar. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. The disclosure
requirements include an application and a balance sheet for the last accounting period. The
capitalization floor is approximately U.S. $900 (R5m), as compared with U.S. $5,000
(R28m) on RTS-1.
223See Olga Popova, New Russia Shares Market Widens Investment Horizon, REUTER
EUR. Bus. REP., Feb. 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. Notably,
such "downgrading" and "upgrading" movements of companies between RTS-1 and RTS-2
have already begun, with the concomitant perception of a company's move to RTS-1 as a
boon to its liquidity and credibility. In March 1997, for example, two regional power com-
panies, Kubanenergo and Kolenergo, were upgraded to RTS-1, while the Far Eastern Ship-
ping Company's financial troubles and loss of liquidity contributed to its slip to RTS-2. See
Durham, supra note 83, at 96.
2
4For example, federal law does not require brokers to immediately report trades, and
clients rarely do so either. This results in wide spreads and transparency problems. See,
Popova, supra note 223.
25 This statement is not to say that other administrative sanctions may not also be appro-
priate in certain situations. The emphasis on "trading system" enforcement, however, will be
more visible to investors than a fine, and less severe than issue nullification.
2 6Because firms trading on the "lower" system would by the same token be more risky,
the FCSM might consider strictly limiting the amount of "soft" information and rosy earn-
ings projections that such firms will be tempted to make.
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minimal disclosure efforts with placement on a "lower" trading system
would serve roughly the same function as a Standard & Poor or Moody's
rating in the United States. 7  Along the same lines, NAUFUR and the
FCSM may consider the introduction of a third trading system, with thresh-
old capitalization and disclosure requirements halfway between those of
RTS-1 and RTS-2.228
b. Issuing Abroad and At Home
One of the more promising recent methods of policing the opportunis-
tic behavior of Russian issuers owes little to the watchful administration of
existing laws by the FCSM, the procuray, 229 or the courts. Rather, a semi-
strong check on securities abuses is here a product of the placement of secu-
rities with foreign institutional investors and the listing of these securities
on overseas exchanges.2Y0 Russian companies that do so may be as inter-
ested in preserving the value of their reputational capital as they are keen to
grow the more tangible kind, particularly if they plan on returning to the
international markets in the future. The check may be temporary, but it is
undoubtedly present. Several factors explain its existence. First, Russian
institutional investors tend to "buy to control assets, not to take a portfolio
view on companies' potential long-term growth."'' 1 Second, the Russian
227Perhaps taking its cue from the NAUFUR initiative, the FCSM has announced plans
to establish minor trade floors on existing stock exchanges for risk-averse, small-scale in-
vestors in Russian stocks. The trading floors are to function as more accessible alternatives
to the Russian Trading System (where trades are carried out by professional brokers in
minimum lots of $5,000). See Russian FSC Set to Improve Conditions for Private Investors,
NOVECON, Apr. 21, 1997 (reprinted from Delovoi Mir, Apr. 17, 1997), available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld File.228The advantages for smaller firms that start out disclosing less than the full salvo of in-
formation currently required by the 1996 Securities Law are several: first, investors will be
aware of such firms' securities and will be able to roughly gauge their value without be-
coming unnecessarily involved in difficult individual monitoring; second, such firms, par-
ticularly if they are just starting up, are already sufficiently risky investments as not to be
exceptionally disadvantaged by being associated with similarly risky firms on RTS-2; third,
a long time spent on a lower-ranked system without any upward movement would send a
clear signal about the openness of a firm's management, just as an extended presence on a
higher-ranked system would give the impression of a firm's commitment to transparency and
fair dealing; and fourth, it would leave to the individual firm the decision on how to balance
the costs of disclosure against the benefits of a presence on a higher-ranked RTS.
29Procuracy ("Prokuratura" in Russian) is roughly comparable to the U.S. District At-
torney's Office, i.e., the prosecution in criminal cases.
230 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44
21See Lee, Russian Winter, supra note 16, at 54 (quoting Charles Harman of MC Secu-
rities). The frenzied scramble for control of Russian assets, as seen, for example, in the 1995
loans-for-shares auction, revealed a common motive on the part of Russian company manag-
ers, politicians, and banks to keep share prices down, enabling them to purchase large stakes
as cheaply as possible. Id. at 53.
Does Russia Need a Securities Law?
18:111 (1997)
equity market is, in the view of one observer, "entirely driven by foreign
capital,"' 2 with foreign investors purchasing stakes openly where possible
or by circuitous means where necessary.2
3
Because placements outside Russia require a substantial upgrade in the
quality of a firm's informational disclosure, a self-enforcing approach
might require a company that issues and/or lists its securities overseas to
simultaneously make the issue available for purchase by domestic investors,
particularly retail investors and mutual funds. This requirement would offer
domestic investors the opportunity to acquaint themselves with - and pur-
chase the shares of - companies that have a lot to lose from downgrading
their reputational capital through flagrant misrepresentations or fraudulent
activities. As in the United States, a retail investor's best protection will
often be an alignment of his interests with those of a foreign institutional
investor who owns the same stock.
2 34
The converse may also hold true. When a Russian firm plans a distri-
bution to the domestic market, a self-enforcing law might require it to place
a portion of the issue with foreign investors, or list on a foreign exchange
that has a certain minimal disclosure requirement . 35 For both types of issu-
ers - those who want to issue abroad as against those who plan to issue at
home - the FCSM must carefully weigh several factors. Some firms may
z32 See Caplen, supra note 44, at 9 (citing Eugene Tanenbaum of Salomon Brothers).
23 Gazprom, a Russian company holding one-third of the world's known gas reserves, is
considered a strategically important concern and is restricted to a quota of 9% on foreign eq-
uity ownership. Nevertheless, some Moscow-based investment banks have been establishing
Russian-registered companies to purchase additional Gazprom shares on behalf of foreign
clients with rumors of tacit approval by Gazprom management. See John Thornhill, Playing
Russian Roulette with Gazprom, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at 31.
'.4 Cf Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(i)
(1996), which states that in connection with the appointment of a lead plaintiff to head a
class action in private securities litigation, "the court ... shall appoint as lead plaintiff the
member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most ca-
pable of adequately representing the interests of class members .... ." The Act was drafted
on the assumption that the plaintiffs having the most at stake in a litigation, as well as the
ones having the most capable, least self-interested counsel, will most often be institutional
investors, and such investors will therefore generally be "most capable of adequately repre-
senting the interests of class members."
235 This structural constraint is supported by the recent resolution of the Surgutneftegaz
controversy, in which Surgut Holding diluted shares in the Surgutneftegaz Oil Company by
purchasing an entire issue of its shares at below-market prices without offering the same op-
portunity to the company's other shareholders. The FCSM successfully pressured Surgut
Holding to pay an additional $36 million for the shares, but only as a result of indirect inter-
vention by the SEC, then considering an application by Surgut to issue ADRs in the United
States. See Peter Henderson, Russian Shareholder Problems Remain Post-Mosenergo,
REUTER EuR. Bus. REP., Apr. 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
Although the sum paid by Surgut Holding was still below market price, Surgutneftegaz also
agreed to amend its charter, giving shareholders preemptive rights over future share issues.
See Durham, supra, note 83, at 99.
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be exceedingly high investment risks, to the point where a placement on the
international markets may be impractical. 236 Such firms might also have the
option of listing their securities on a lower-ranked trading system in ex-
change for a lessened disclosure burden. Self-enforcement ought not to re-
quire doctrinal rigidity as a substitute for good sense: it may exclude firms
below a certain capitalization from the requirement of issuing overseas, de-
spite the fact that such firms are excellent candidates for co-monitoring by
international investors. The FCSM will also need to decide what percent-
age of each firm's intended total placement will be made overseas (or con-
versely, at home), and what factors undergird such calculations.2 37
It is unnecessary for the self-enforcing model to make mandatory list-
ing or placement of securities on the international capital markets a perma-
nent feature of Russian securities law. The model's efficiencies are realized
from the harnessing of the regulatory structures of more mature economies,
the developed enforcement and monitoring capacities of sophisticated for-
eign investors, and the valuable reputational capital that firms planning re-
turns to the international capital markets have at stake. As the Russian legal
system matures and becomes capable of policing refractory Russian
firms,238 this system of enforcement will become unnecessary. But in the
interim, self-enforcing regulations such as this one can provide the neces-
sary groundwork for gradually attracting retail investors back into the mar-
12 6A foreign placement may, for example, be rejected by non-Russian investors either
entirely or partially. The foreign placement would then be little more than punitive, as the
costs of the extra due diligence, documentation, auditing, and counsel would exceed the
revenue earned from the distribution.
1
7Beyond capitalization, one might consider a non-exclusive list of such items as past
experience in issuing to international capital markets, the listing of a given firm's securities
on foreign exchanges, the length of time such securities were listed without undergoing any
disciplinary actions by foreign regulatory bodies, and the number and seriousness of recent
disciplinary actions by the FCSM.238It is possible to argue that blaming the Russian courts for the inadequacy of enforce-
ment of current laws reflects an unsupported bias in the Western media. See, e.g., Bauer,
supra note 18, at 373 ("[W]hile incompetent judges, bribed officials and private law en-
forcement can be found in today's Russia, what often remains untold is that there is, against
all odds, a functioning system with hard-working people trying to overcome all these diffi-
culties."). However, even a system of competent judges and efficient courts would have an
extremely difficult time overcoming the legacy of private dispute resolution left over from
the extra-legality of Soviet-em black market transactions. In addition, the evasion of the
taxes remains an acknowledged problem. See March 5 Press Conference, supra note 61:
If the tax issue remains in its present state, everything will go into offshore operations.
We wouldn't be able to stop the process. We can tighten border controls and post 10
policemen, but the money will still escape. So, taxes above all, are the key. And we
should not tolerate the provisions that are in the Tax Code now ....
And, perhaps most crucially, many securities violators will never face sanctions unless
the 1996 Securities Law provides an explicit private right of action for retail investors.
See id.
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ket with minimal reliance placed on domestic enforcement mechanisms still
unfit to execute their critical policing roles.
c. The Taming of the FIGs
According to Professor Brown, unless Russia undertakes the kind of
strict separation between the commercial and investment banking sectors
maintained in the United States under the Glass-Steagall Act, a bank-
dominated corporate finance system will emerge, stifling the Russian secu-
rities market and slowing economic development.239 Consistent with this
argument, the FCSM has initiated an active licensing campaign for market
participants, allegedly with the express intention of building the Chinese
Wall that Professor Brown envisions.240 The construction of this elaborate
regulatory edifice, however, is of dubious value regardless of its likelihood
of success. Even at its U.S. wellspring, the separation between commercial
banking and the securities industry has been repeatedly questioned.241  A
similar separation in Russia will undoubtedly produce another regulatory
quagmire that the FCSM will have to police in addition to all its other func-
tions.242 Moreover, it will exacerbate unnecessary friction between the
FCSM on the one side, and the banks under the regulation of the Russian
Central Bank on the other.243 The FCSM does not need to wage a political
239 See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, passim.
240 See FSC's Thumb on New Market, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File ("[FCSM Chairman] Vasilyev... is fond of the Ameri-
can model, which prohibits banks from conducting transactions directly on the securities
market. Moving in that direction, the [FCSM] is planning to limit banks' trading of corpo-
rate bonds.") Vasilyev has confirmed his intention of re-licensing professional market par-
ticipants, as well as intensive policing of licensing violations:
The fundamental task of 1997 is to create a system of licensing and control over the ac-
tivities of all professionalparticipants on the securities market. In 1996 we raised the
issue of registrars. In 1997 we should re-register all brokers and dealers, re-register ex-
changes, the depositary system should develop, we should license depositaries and,
most important, a regular system of control has been created. A system of control and
verification. We cannot limit ourselves just to the issuance of licenses. This is not
enough and this will never suit us. The might of the Western securities markets rests on
constant control effected by corresponding commissions.
March 5 Press Conference, supra note 61 (emphasis added).241 See Momentum, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1997, at 75-6; Michelle Celarier, Chipping at the
Firewalls, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1996, at 52.
242 See FSC's Thumb on New Market, supra note 240. Contrary to his subsequent advo-
cacy of a Glass-Steagal-type legislation for Russia, Professor Brown has written elsewhere
that "[p]residential decrees or Duma-adopted laws... would not solve the market's disorder.
Enhancing the authority of the bureaucracy would similarly be ineffective. Only by encour-
aging market forces already in place would the markets become more transparent and effec-
tive." Brown, Order from Disorder, supra note 97, at 552.
243 Banks have complained that the FCSM's efforts to act as the sole licensor of deposito-
ries have been ill-conceived attempts to edge banks out of the custodial market. See Federal
Commission Issues Rules on Disclosure, Custodial Services, WORLD SEC. L. REP., Dec.
1996, at 8-9. As regulatory watchdog of the banks, the Central Bank too has railed against
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turf war in addition to enforcing the multitude of regulations it has already
put in place.2"
If it were to "win" by effectively ejecting Russian banks from the secu-
rities markets, the FCSM might perhaps preserve both the commercial
lending and securities market channel for the flow of financing to industry.
If it did so, the FCSM would act at the expense of an alternative system,
such as Germany's, where commercial banks actively monitor companies
by owning substantial stakes and voting shares which they hold as custodi-
ans.245 It is unclear which system - one dominated by the securities mar-
ket or by banks - is inherently better. In the case of Russia, with its
distinct set of political and economic institutions, its immense economic
potential, and its history of centralized oversight, perhaps neither is best,
and the two systems should be allowed to compete,246 without permitting
either side to monopolize the system.247 The challenge, then, is to keep the
banks from dominating the process of raising capital without cutting off
their valuable ability to act as corporate monitors. The U.S. alternative
would unnecessarily involve the FCSM in needless political infighting and
burdensome additional enforcement duties based on a highly debatable
ideological position. The adoption of a bank-dominated European or Japa-
nese alternative would swing the pendulum too far in the other direction, so
that a few dominant banks would provide the Russian government with an
irresistible target for intrusive regulatory intervention.248
what it sees as the FCSM's intrusion on its turf. See Russia Toughens Depository Rules;
Consolidates Them Under FCSM, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Feb. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Allwld File. Chairman Vasilyev, however, continues to stress the key role
played by the FCSM in Russia, stating: "[T]he Central Bank [is responsible] for market and
banking stability and the Commission [is responsible] for stock market stability and inves-
tors' rights protection. Bank or no bank, an intermediary will die if the investor does not
come to the market with his money." Russia's Securities Commission Wants More Power,
supra note 80.2"The conflict between the FCSM and the Central Bank briefly came to a head in mid-
1996 when a rogue presidential decree stripped the Commission of its ministry status and
placed it under the control of the Ministry of Finance. Two weeks later, a second decree re-
instated the Commission to its previous status. One FCSM official summed up the basis for
the conflict as follows: "Russia's big commercial banks don't like it that the commission
follows the American model of broad public ownership, shareholder rights and a strong mu-
tual fund industry." See Durham, supra note 83, at 100-101.245 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 171-177 (1994). Professor Roe argues that the lack of cor-
porate monitoring by institutions has left senior management at large U.S. firms minimally
accountable to shareholders during much of the twentieth century. Id. at 9.
2461d. at 234.
247 See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
248See Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 249; ROE, supra note 245, at 234
("[E]nhanced institutional power may lead to calls for enhanced government involvement in
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With this situation in mind, a self-enforcing approach might co-opt the
cross-shareholding groupings being formed around the leading Russian
commercial banks. The FCSM may subject the controlling stakeholders in
issuing companies to joint-and-several liability for misrepresentations or
omissions in disclosure, or for other abuses on the part of management.249 A
hypothetical rule would state that in exchange for affiliate status,250 a
stakeholder and its affiliates will be jointly-and-severally liable for the vio-
lations of the securities laws by the issuing company. Moreover, the rule
might require that a company which by itself or together with its affiliates is
capitalized at more than U.S. $500 million251 and which takes a controlling
stake in a firm must ensure that within eighteen months such firm is eligible
to be listed, and is listed, on RTS-1, or the system or exchange requiring the
most complete informational transparency and integrity from its partici-
pants.
It is of course arguable that this heightened liability for Russian com-
mercial banks will be an even greater incentive for banks to prevent the
firms they control from issuing securities and disclosing to the market; in-
economic planning, which has tended not to work well in the United States, and may yet
prove to work poorly abroad.").
2491 am indebted to Professor Reinier Kraakman for suggesting this idea.
50 To my knowledge, the definition of "affiliate" common to U.S. securities laws has not
yet been put to meaningful use in Russia. Despite the fact that the Joint-Stock Company
Law mentions affiliates in Articles 89, 92, and 93, it defines "affiliate" by reference to the
definition in RF antimonopoly legislation. However, the only current definition of an affili-
ated person is provided by the Presidential Decree No. 1186 (1992) on investment funds [0
Merakh Po Organizatsii Rynka Tsennykh Bumag v Protsesse Privatizatsii Gosudarstvennykh
i Munitsypal'nykh Predpriati], Article 4, which states that "affiliated persons" include a
company's CEO, directors and other officers, its founders, shareholders that own 25% or
more of its shares, or any enterprise of whose voting shares the company owns 25% or more.
Antimonopoly legislation, by contrast, defines "legal entities controlling each other's prop-
erty" (iuridicheskie litsa kontroliruiuschie imushchestvo drug druga) but not "affiliated per-
sons" (affilirovannye litsa). "Legal entities controlling each other's property" are defined as
legal entities that have no opportunity to control each other's activities by virtue of (i) own-
ership by one legal entity of 25% of (probably not only voting) shares in another entity; (ii)
ownership by one legal entity of any number of shares conferring rights to cast 50% of the
votes in another entity; or (iii) having at least one-fourth of the same individuals as elected
officers in common among different legal entities. See "Instruction on the Procedure of
Controlling Acquisition of Shares of Partnerships and Common Registered Shares of Joint
Stock Companies and the Procedure of Considering Persons as Controlling Each Other's
Property," State Antimonopoly Committee Decree No. 5, § 7, Jan. 18, 1994; Olga Sirodoeva,
The New Joint Stock Company Law, 3 PARKER SCH. J.E. EuR. L. 85, 89 (1996).
Because the Joint-Stock Company Law is not moored to this or any other definition of an
affiliate, its affiliate-related provisions are devoid of meaning. Hence, the first step would be
to instate a workable and consistent definition of an affiliate that can be incorporated by ref-
erence into a variety of legal acts, or enlist the concept provided by the antimonopoly legis-
lation.
2s' The number is hypothetical, but must represent the capitalization of a commercial
bank and the members of its industrial group.
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stead, the banks might be tempted to meet the capital needs of such firms
with syndicated loans. This argument overlooks the fact that the most at-
tractive targets of acquisition - the firms with the largest prospects for
growth and the most extensive access to raw materials such as oil and gas
- are the very same firms that require billions of dollars each in capital
improvements and modernization in order to be profitable.252 It is unlikely
that even the well-heeled Russian banks can coordinate loans on such a gar-
gantuan scale, particularly if they plan to make further acquisitions.253
This structural regulation is not meant simply as a stick to beat over the
heads of the banks and their keiretsu partners. It offers substantial rewards
in exchange for the risks imposed. If they are serious about acting as le-
gitimate corporate monitors, Russian banks can continue to acquire and
hold controlling stakes in firms provided that, through active monitoring of
company management and vigorous encouragement of company transpar-
ency, they increase the liquidity of the securities that such firms issue. By
doing so, the banks will benefit in the long-term by raising the share prices
of such firms' securities, drawing in retail investors, and promoting confi-
dence in the Russian securities markets. They would also be able to more
easily rid themselves of their stakes in loss-making enterprises, rather than
subsidize them with funds from profitable companies in their respective
banking or industrial groups. Once such companies are cut adrift, they will
have a securities market to fall back on, if and when they attempt to re-
structure themselves.25 4 Without such a safety net in place, the Russian
252See The Year of the Bond, supra note 60, at 90 ("Russian entities all have a significant
capital requirement,... [a]nd there is not the money in Russia to meet that. Companies are
not going to raise large sums of money - either from Russian banks or from Russian insti-
tutional investors, because it is just not there at the moment."). For example, Gazprom's
planned pipeline from the Yamal gas field to the West alone is expected to cost between $15
billion and $40 billion. See Barraclough, supra note 45; Lee, Russian Winter, supra note 16.
253 This set of facts is only tenuously analogous to the situation in the United States at the
end of the nineteenth century. It is possible that U.S. bank syndicates could have provided
adequate credit to American industry, were it not for a concerted political mistrust of the
power of commercial banks. As a result of the National Bank Acts of 1863 and 1864, banks
were confined to a single geographic location. Additionally, in California Bank v. Kennedy,
167 U.S. 362 (1892), the Supreme Court denied banks the right to own stock in corporations.
Banks were consequently shut out of any meaningful controlling or monitoring role because
no single bank was capable of providing the necessary financing to even a single large U.S.
industrial company. See ROE, supra note 245, at 54-55. Today, even within bank-centered
Japanese keiretsus, less than half of a firm's borrowed funds come directly from a main
bank. Rather, loan syndicates are the sources of a majority of loans to Japanese companies.
See Macey & Miller, supra note 101, at 63 n.24 (citing Horiuchi, The Effect of Firm Status
on Banking Relationships and Loan Syndication, (Universita Degli Di Siena, Quademi Del
Dipartimento Di Economica Politica) (1994) at 20-21 & Table 11.2
5The absence of a vigorous non-bank capital market in Japan has led to much more
painful consequences for many firms whose relationship with their main lender banks were
opportunistically terminated by such lenders. The banks do not make legally binding prom-
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government might be tempted to enforce a regulatory system that would
selectively pressure banks to save failing firms. 2 In view of Russia's his-
tory of state involvement in the market, this new intrusion would be espe-
cially lamentable.
The regulation of banks in Russia should also take into account the im-
plications of bank-dominated capital markets on smaller firms. Large firms
have traditionally had easier access to funds because they could alternately
turn to banks or securities markets for capital.25 6 With respect to smaller
firms, however, the European experience is more indicative. Since 1995,
the introduction of six new European secondary markets has propelled a
number of IPOs by high-tech companies starved for investment. 7 Beyond
sorely-needed cash, access to these markets has enabled smaller firms to se-
cure the kind of visibility among investors and customers which American
firms have long enjoyed .
Encouragement of multiple trading systems and enrollment of banks as
both company monitors and facilitators of disclosure to the securities mar-
kets are therefore particularly important for large Russian firms whose
managers are more apt to ignore or betray small shareholders. With respect
to smaller firms, weak securities markets and bank domination of the capi-
tal raising process are often a recipe for underdevelopment through capital
starvation.Y9 Carefully crafted structural constraints on the securities mar-
ket, commercial banks, and corporate management should seek an optimal
balance between overintrusive intervention and vague default rules that
provide little guidance for market participants. It is certainly arguable that
the "self-enforcing" approach to securities regulation in Russia does not
generate such optimal conditions. The main virtue of the self-enforcing ap-
proach, however, lies in its awareness of the characteristics and concepts
ises to support and restructure failing firms precisely because Japanese courts can and do en-
force such bargains once struck. See Milhaupt, supra note 191, at 36-37,45-46.
25 The Japanese Ministry of Finance has periodically exerted precisely this pressure on
Japan's banks. See id. at 38.
26See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
'5See Gail Edmondson & Heidi Dawley, Europe as High-Tech Heaven?, Bus. WK.
(Int'l Ed.), May 12, 1997. The markets include London's Alternative Investment Market
("AIM"), Brussels-based EASDAQ, Paris-based Nouveau Marche, Frankfurt's Neuer Markt,
Euro NM Belgium, and Amsterdam's NMAX. As of April 1997, over 170 IPOs have taken
place on these new markets.
2581d. The term "small firm" should be seen in context against the backdrop of much
larger international concerns. See Richard Smith, A Slow Start for Easdaq, INsrTUONAL
INVESTOR (Int'l Ed.), Apr. 1997, at 37 (Companies listing on the newly established ex-
changes "are not startups. They're all well-established and have raised substantial amounts
of money.").
2g9 See generally Brown, Brokers, Banks, supra note 24, at 218-219 (discussing the ad-
vantages to smaller firms having a strong securities market when operating with bank domi-
nation of the capital-raising process).
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that distinguish Russia from the United States, Japan, or continental Europe,
and that distinguish Russia's nascent market infrastructure from their highly
path-dependent economies and regulatory frameworks.
260
IV. LIMITS OF THE SELF-ENFORCING MODEL AND CONCLUSION
Self-enforcement does not by any means seek to displace the key roles
played by the FCSM, the Russian courts, and the Russian government. Nor
does it purport to de-emphasize clear rules in favor of some invisible hand
guiding self-regulating market institutions in the pursuit of mutual gain. On
the contrary, the model's dominant principle is the clarification of rules and
laws, and the elimination of drafting ambiguities wherever possible. Secu-
rities regulation constructed on self-enforcing principles obviously cannot
succeed without strict enforcement of those rules that it does introduce.
Given clear rules and unambiguous principles, such enforcement can be ap-
propriately heavy-handed,261 but only as long as sanctions and remedies are
explicitly defined, not left to be developed by the courts on a case-by-case
basis.262 Concepts like "material" information or "grossly negligent" dis-
closure offer no baseline for comparison with other instances of similar
violations, and provide an issuer with little assurance of their evenhanded
and consistent application by the courts or other enforcement agencies.263
Yet clarity of language is only a halfway measure. The other central
concept of the self-enforcing model relies on structural constraints that co-
260In an article by Professors Macey and Miller, supra note 101, at 71-72, the authors
argue in favor of a level playing field for the U.S. commercial banking sector as well as for
capital markets in Germany and Japan. They reason that nearly a century of retarding legis-
lation has eliminated the danger that U.S. banks might intervene in corporate governance and
stifle capital markets; neither U.S. institutional investors nor U.S. companies would today
countenance such intrusion.
Without such institutional investors, and without well-developed capital markets to fa-
cilitate hostile takeover bids as restraints on blatant mismanagement or self-dealing, it is not
clear that the same hands-off approach would benefit Russia. Few if any path-dependent
variables can today restrain the comparatively strong Russian banking sector from staking
out a dominant role in corporate governance and smothering a nascent securities market un-
less the Russian government actively pursues a contrary policy. Such a policy will succeed
only if it treats both the banks and securities market participants evenhandedly while recog-
nizing the strengths and motivations of both sides.
261 Heightened severity of sanctions is justified not merely by the fact that clear regula-
tions leave less room for misunderstanding or misinterpretation, but also as compensation for
the cost of discovering the violation. See Black & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 1972.262See id. at 1971.
263 The Joint-Stock Company Law, for example, does not impose liability on directors for
decisions made in good faith, but rather for decisions made recklessly or with gross negli-
gence. The reason is a lack of confidence in the ability of Russian courts to determine what
conduct is "grossly negligent" under the circumstances. The Law also seeks to encourage
managers to take long-term risks despite the absence of readily available information. See
Black & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 1973.
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opt already viable institutions to police firms and their affiliates, and in-
crease investors' confidence in the securities market they have so far
shunned. The tripartite framework of multiple trading systems, compulsory
issuance on the international (or alternatively, domestic) markets, and active
policing of firms by their affiliated commercial banks constitutes a nonex-
clusive set of self-enforcing arrangements. With respect to banks, the opti-
mal goal would be to align their interests with the interests of shareholders,
ensuring that banks progressively see themselves as, and act like, very large
shareholders rather than as fixed claimants only. In developed economies,
such a framework would rightly elicit opposition as unnecessary, intrusive,
and arbitrary. In Russia, the framework compensates for the absence of
adequate resources or experience among the administrative and judicial
bodies charged with regulating the securities market, as well as the persis-
tent hostility of many managers to minority shareholders.
Most importantly, perhaps, the self-enforcing model should be above
politics and ideology. It should serve primarily as a vehicle for the efficient
allocation of capital and the protection of all investors, given the prevailing
institutional pressures and inadequacies. Before attempting to implement
one or another of the model's rules, careful attention should be given to
three equally important considerations: does the rule make good economic
sense; will it be enforceable; and will it be effective in reaching the desired
policy goal. In the final view, a self-enforcing model of securities regula-
tion is neutral as to which policy it effectuates.
There is a large measure of folly in cloning one country's laws on the
basis of another's without giving appropriate thought to the highly idiosyn-
cratic set of actors on which such laws will operate, or the consequences if
they fail. The success of Poland's regulatory system does not, as I have ar-
gued above,2 4 provide a template for Russia, even though its economy and
development since the breakup of the Soviet Union bear a much stronger
resemblance to Russia's today than to the United States' during the 1930s.
The Joint-Stock Company Law and the self-enforcing model on which it is
based have begun the transformation of Russian corporate law with due at-
tention to Russia's characteristic challenges and problems. While its suc-
cess is by no means certain, the model holds out hope of curbing the abuses
and opportunistic behavior of managers and directors within the specific
context of Russia's industrialized, but only recently privatized, economy.
Some of the flexibility of the enabling model of corporate law found in the
United States and England is sacrificed in favor of an emphasis on clear
rules and enforcement through structural means. Insofar as the 1996 Secu-
rities Law envisions a strong, transparent securities market open to all po-
tential investors, a self-enforcing approach seeks to ensure that this vision is
not defeated by a facile duplication of another country's regulatory system.
26See supra text accompanying notes 193-96.
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It is important now to "get right" the regulatory and market system being
created in Russia, for it just may be the system that reminds its creators of
their mistakes for decades to come.
